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INTRODUCTION

D

ISPUTES concerning decisions made by boards of directors of
Delaware corporations are initially decided by the Delaware
Court of Chancery, an equity court.' The Chancery Court applies
the statutory laws and adapts the common law to balance the complex and varied interests of the board, the shareholders and other
affected parties. Since the Delaware courts must decide issues that
can dramatically affect the business world, they are cognizant of
their role as providers of stability and certainty for corporate decision-makers. At the same time, they try to ensure a just and fair
result in the case before them.
As in popular sports, knowledge of the rules of the game is a
prerequisite for playing the game. Winning, however, requires
preparation, skill, luck and an understanding of the fundamentals
of the game. This Article focuses on the fundamentals.
Typically, corporate litigation begins when a shareholder challenges a board's decision. The challenging shareholder may bring
suit to prevent the corporation from taking action, to require the
corporation to take action or to seek damages arising out of actions
or decisions made by the board. These cases require the court to
review the challenged board decisions. In doing so, the court must
decide upon and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the
board action. The level of scrutiny is frequently referred to as "the
1.Delaware's preeminent stature in corporate litigation can be attributed, in
large part, to the sound and consistent application of the Delaware General Corporation Law by its equity courts to expedite disputes concerning the application of
the business judgment rule. In Delaware, jurisdiction over corporate litigation is
vested in the Court of Chancery. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 14. See Michael Hanrahan,
The Development of the DelawareCourt of Chancey as a CorporateForum, 2 DEL. LAW. 34
(Spring 1984); Donald E. Schwartz, The Delaware Chancey Court: A National Court of
CorporateLaw, 2 DEL. LAw. 54 (Spring 1984). In Delaware, unreported decisions of
the Court of Chancery traditionally have had persuasive authority. Appeals from
decisions of the Court of Chancery are decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware.
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11, cl. 4.
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standard of review." The court must also decide which party, the
challenging shareholder or the board, will have the burden of
proof with respect to the issues involved in the case.
Delaware courts have played a preeminent role in defining fiduciary duties because of the significant number of major corporations incorporated in Delaware. In recent years, increased
shareholder scrutiny of board decisions has resulted in many cases
brought by shareholders challenging board decisions. In turn, the
Delaware courts have recently decided a number of cases which discuss and clarify the basic duties of Delaware directors.
This Article is intended to be a primer for the practitioner or
student who seeks the basic rules of Delaware corporate law when a
shareholder challenges a board's decision. Because the variety of
shareholder challenges are as diverse as the shareholders themselves, this Article is written in two parts. In Part I, we outline the
rules applicable in the majority of cases in which boards' decisions
are challenged. As noted below, the Delaware courts presume that
the board's decision was proper and in the best interests of the corporation, unless the shareholder can show a breach of the board's
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith. If the shareholder
rebuts the court's presumption of propriety, known as the "business
judgment rule," then the court will apply a stricter standard of review and require the board to show that its decisions were "entirely
fair" to the shareholders.
In Section II of this Article, we discuss the basic fiduciary duties
of care, 2 loyalty3 and good faith 4 owed by board members to their
shareholders and the protections afforded to the board by the business judgment rule. Section III addresses how shareholders can rebut the business judgment rule.5 In addition, this section discusses
the variety of arguments available to the shareholder challenging a
board's decision.
Section IV of this Article discusses the necessity, adequacy and
effect of disclosures made by the board to the shareholders when
the board seeks shareholder approval of a board decision. 6 Section
2. For a discussion of the duty of care, see infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the duty of loyalty, see infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the duty of good faith, see infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of rebutting the business judgment rule presumption, see
infra notes 19-75 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of liability due to lack of disclosure, see infra notes 80-108
and accompanying text.
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V discusses the fiduciary duties and potential liabilities of share7
holders who control the board either in fact or in effect.
Finally, we discuss the procedural rules governing most types of
corporate litigation. Section VI discusses the issues that arise when
a shareholder seeks to assert a derivative claim on the corporation's
behalf.8 Such claims frequently, but not always, are made against
directors for alleged violations of their fiduciary duties. Section VII
of this Article discusses how the standard of review and burden of
pleading and proof can shift depending on the procedural status of
the dispute. 9
In Part II, which will be published in a forthcoming issue of
this Law Review, we discuss, among other things, the standard of
review and burden of proof when the board adopts defensive measures to protect the corporation from a takeover or when the board
decides to sell the company. We will also discuss the effect independent board approval or shareholder ratification can have on
the standard of review and the burden of proof issues.
We note at the outset that this Article is not intended to be a
treatise on the duties of directors under Delaware law or advice for
all practitioners on the best litigation tactic for all situations. We
have made no effort to discuss all possible nuances of each topic.
Given the myriad of situations and almost endless permutations,
such exploration would be virtually impossible. Rather, this Article
is intended to be a primer on the basic rules governing shareholder
challenges to a board's decision. The ultimate goal of this Article is
to enable the student and practitioner to understand the fundamentals in order to appreciate, and take advantage of, the nuances
which experienced lawyers utilize to win close cases.

II.

SHAREHOLDER CHALLENGES TO BOARD BUSINESS DECISIONSDIREcToRs' DUTIES TO THE CORPORATION AND THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

A.

The Business Judgment Rule

Generally, the board of directors has the sole responsibility to
manage the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation.10 This
7. For a discussion of the potential liabilities of directors, see infra notes 10916 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the derivative challenges to board action, see infra notes
117-200 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of understanding the shifting litigation burdens, see infra
notes 201-71 and accompanying text.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974 & Supp. 1994) ("rhe business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/1

4

Palm and Kearney: A Primer on the Basics of Directors' Duties in Delaware: The Rule

1995]

RULES OF THE GAME

1301

responsibility comes with the concomitant fiduciary obligation to
protect the corporation and act in its, and its shareholders', best
interest.1" Delaware directors owe three fundamental duties to the
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) [hereinafter Cede I] ("Our starting point
is the fundamental principle of Delaware law that the business and affairs of a
corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.");
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (holding
directors have ultimate responsibility 'for managing business and affairs of
corporation).
Although managerial discretion traditionally resides in the board of directors,
§ 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law contemplates the ability of the
shareholders to adopt a different corporate governance structure in the certificate.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974 & Supp. 1994) which states:
If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this
chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by any such
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
Id. In addition, if a corporation qualifies as, and elects to be, a statutory close
corporation pursuant to subchapter XIV of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, shareholders may displace the board of directors as the corporation's managing body. Id. § 351 ("The certificate of incorporation of a close corporation may
provide that the business of the corporation shall be managed by the stockholders
of the corporation rather than by a board of directors."). In such a case, the shareholders are subject to the same duties and obligations as the board of directors. Id.
Of course, many important fundamental decisions are reserved to the shareholders and the board agreeing on a course of action. These organic decisions
include fundamental corporate changes such as mergers, amendments to the certificate of incorporation and dissolution. Significantly, one of the shareholders'
sole prerogatives is the ability to elect and, in many cases, remove board members.
Id. § 141(k).
11. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 360 ("[In managing the business and affairs of a corporation], directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the
interests of the corporation and to act in the best interest of its shareholders.");
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) ("[Tlhe directors' exercise of their
managerial power in all its aspects 'is tempered by fundamental fiduciary obligations owed by the directors to the corporation and its shareholders."' (quoting
Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 (Del. 1988))); Mills,
559 A.2d at 1280 ("Not only do [the duties of care and loyalty] demand that corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the trust reposed in
them, but also to affirmatively protect and defend those interests entrusted to
them."); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (concluding board of directors owes duty to protect "corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source");
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (concluding directors have
affirmative duty to protect financial interests and "proceed with a critical eye in
assessing information"); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (declaring
power to manage business and affairs of corporation "carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders"); Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). In Guth, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded:
Public policy... has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing any-
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corporation and the stockholders: the duty of care, the duty of loy12
alty and the duty of good faith.
A shareholder, dissatisfied with a board decision, can challenge
the decision on the ground that the board breached one of its fiduciary duties when it made the decision. In a suit challenging a
board's decision, the shareholder may challenge the decision directly and request that the court issue an injunction preventing the
board from carrying out the decision or requiring the board to
make a different decision. In certain cases, the shareholder may
simply seek damages against the board for harm to the corporation
caused by the allegedly improper board decision.
When a shareholder challenges a board decision, two fundamental questions typically shape the controversy. First, the court
must determine how closely it will scrutinize the board's decision.
This is frequently referred to as the standard of review. Second, the
court must decide which party, the challenging shareholder or the
board, will have the burden of proof with respect to the issues involved in reviewing the board's decision.
Judicial concerns arose that a very stringent review of all board
business decisions was too demanding and inappropriate.1 3 In response to these concerns, courts developed a doctrine known as the
business judgment rule to give boards of directors significant prothing that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit
or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
Id.
12. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)
(discussing triad of fiduciary duties) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (holding directors have duty to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available and duty to act with requisite care)); Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361 (discussing triad
of fiduciary duties); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53,
64 (Del. 1989) (discussing relationship between business judgment rule and triad
of duties); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (discussing director duty of care).
13. Courts and commentators have given several reasons for granting wide
latitude to business judgments made by corporate directors. First, the corporate
statute provides that boards, not shareholders or the courts, are empowered to
manage and direct the business and affairs of corporations. Second, many of the
board's decisions involve value judgments (i.e., what businesses should a corporation pursue, what risks are acceptable, what returns are desired) which may involve
complex and perhaps conflicting methods and goals. Third, because shareholders
choose who their directors will be, they assume the risk that occasionally the director, acting on their behalf, may make decisions that the shareholder would not
have made. Fourth, the market polices the quality of directorate choices through
the stock price; good management tends to push the price of a stock higher than
poor management. Fifth, portfolio diversification lessens the risks to shareholders
of poor director choices. Courts and legislators recognize that one group must
have the final say with respect to corporate decisions. In the Delaware corporate
world, that entity is almost always the board.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/1

6

Palm and Kearney: A Primer on the Basics of Directors' Duties in Delaware: The Rule

1995]

RULES OF THE GAME

1303

tection and discretion in making business decisions.1 4 The business
judgment rule provides the starting point for the appropriate standard of review and burden of proof in cases in which a shareholder
challenges a board's business decision.
The business judgment rule has both procedural and substantive aspects. 15 Procedurally, it acts as an evidentiary presumption
that the directors have acted in accordance with their three fundamental fiduciary duties. The Delaware courts have frequently
stated that the business judgment rule is a "'presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company."' 16 Thus, in litigation challenging a board's business decision, the court initially presumes that the board fulfilled all of its
fiduciary duties when it made the decision. 17 From a procedural
perspective, the challenging shareholder has the initial burden to
14. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 360 ("[The business judgment rule] operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a
corporation.") (citations omitted). In Cede II,the court concluded that the rule
"posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors in that a
decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts
unless it cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."' Id. at 361 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)); see Citron, 569 A.2d
at 64 (concluding business judgment rule protects directors and decisions); Mills,
559 A.2d at 1279 (concluding court "should decline to evaluate the wisdom and
merits of a business decision [made by the board] unless sufficient facts are alleged
with particularity, or the record otherwise demonstrates, that the decision was not
the product of an informed, disinterested, and independent board"); Unocal 493
A.2d at 954 (holding court should not "substitute its judgment for that of the
board" unless board failed to satisfy its fiduciary obligations); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 872 ("The business judgment rule exists to promote the full and free exercise of
the managerial power granted to Delaware directors." (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981))); Sinclair Oi4 280 A.2d at 720 ("A board of
directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A
court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is
not sound business judgment."); A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (suggesting business judgment rule is "a
recognition of the allocation of responsibility made by § 141(a) of the General
Corporation Law and of the limited institutional competence of the courts to assess business decisions").
15. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)
[hereinafter Cede III] (discussing substantive and procedural aspects of business
judgment rule); Cede II, 634 A.2d at 360 (noting business judgment rule "operates
as both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive rule of law" (citing Citron,
569 A.2d at 64)); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (discussing presumption of business judgment rule and procedure for rebutting presumption).
16. E.g., Cede II, 634 A.2d at 360 (stating business judgment rule presumes
corporate directors act with due care, good faith and loyalty) (quoting Aronson,
473 A.2d at 812) (alteration in original).
17. Id. at 361 (noting business judgment rule provides powerful presumption
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show that the board's decision was not proper because the board
violated one or more of its three fundamental duties to the corporation. In other words, the shareholder must rebut the business
judgment rule's presumption of propriety.
Substantively, if the business judgment rule attaches because
the shareholder is unable to show that the board violated one of its
duties to the corporation, the board's decision will be upheld unless the decision is irrational.18 Since the decision is initially presumed to be proper, the burden of proof is on the shareholder to
show that the decision was irrational. Thus, the business judgment
rule protects a business decision made by a board from attack and
protects the directors from liability for the decision unless the
shareholder can rebut the business judgment rule.19
B.

Duty of Care When No Business Judgment is Made

For the business judgment rule to attach, the board must actually make a business judgment involving the business affairs of the
corporation. A conscious decision of the board to act or not to act
constitutes a business judgment.2 0 When the directors fail to act
without making a decision or abdicate their managerial responsibilities, however, the business judgment rule does not apply because
no business judgment is made.2 1 In such cases, the directors might
be liable for a breach of their general duty of care. The standard of
review, however, differs from cases in which the board does make a
business judgment.
Delaware has no statute delineating the board's duty of care.
Instead, the courts have stated that the board's duty of care requires
that "directors ...in managing corporate affairs are bound to use
director decisions made by loyal and informed board will not be overturned if
related to rational business purpose).
18. For a discussion of rationality, see infra notes 56-64 and accompanying
text.
19. E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
45 n.17 (Del. 1994) (noting where business judgment rule "is applicable and the
board acted with due care, in good faith, and in honest belief that they were acting
in the best interest of stockholders," courts give great deference to director decisions); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (holding absent abuse of discretion, courts respect
directors' decisions).
20. E.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) (en banc) (noting when independent and informed board acts in good faith they have made
business judgment); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("[A] conscious decision to refrain
from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy
the protections of the rule.").
21. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (stating business judgment rule has no impact
where directors have "abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision,
failed to act").
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that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men
would use in similar circumstances."22 Case law is unsettled on the
degree of culpability required to impose liability. Although authority exists that liability attaches for simple negligence when the
board makes no business judgment, at least one commentator has
concluded that duty of care liability is imposed in such cases only if
23
the directors were grossly negligent in failing to act.
22. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (dicta);
see also Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. CIV.A.7547, 1987 WL 28436, at
*2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (stating where director has failed to exercise proper
control of corporate affairs, court will look to what "ordinary careful and prudent
[director] would [do] in similar circumstances" to determine whether director has
breached duty of care); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALo~rI & JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAwARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.7, at 4-168 (1985 &
Supp. 1992) (noting general standard of care is "'amount of care which ordinarily
prudent men would use in similar circumstances"' (quoting Graham, 188 A.2d at
130)); DENNISJ. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESSJUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 58-59 (4th ed. 1993) (stating Delaware applies majority rule
of ordinary prudent person standard) (citing Graham, 188 A.2d at 130).
Graham involved a derivative action claiming director liability for the board's
failure to act against employee activity which violated Federal anti-trust laws. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127. Originally, the complaint alleged that the directors either
knew of the activity or knew of facts that should have put them on notice of the
activity violating the anti-trust laws. Id. After the court determined that there was
no evidence of knowledge, the plaintiff shareholders claimed "the directors are
liable as a matter of law by reason of their failure to take action designed to learn
of and prevent [the illegal] activity on the part of [the company's] employees." Id.
The court found that the directors were not liable for their failure to act. Id. at
131.
23. Compare 1 BA.LoTTi & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 22, § 4.8, at 4-201 to 4-204
(1993 Supp.) (concluding gross negligence is "probably" the standard) and E.
Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard-SafeHarbor or Unchartered Reef?: An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care of Corporationswith Delaware
Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 927-29 (1980) (making "educated guess" gross negligence
standard but also noting distinction between ordinary and gross negligence makes
little practical difference) with Rabkin, 1987 WL 28436, at *3 (finding proper standard to be ordinary negligence) and S. Samuel Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of
Directors, Officers & Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652, 659 (1979) (reviewing
standard in Graham and concluding ordinary negligence is applicable standard).
The Delaware Supreme Court has not clearly indicated whether it would apply
a gross negligence or ordinary negligence standard in a nonfeasance or abdication
situation. The debate arises because the ordinary person standard announced in
Graham is an ordinary negligence standard. After stating the standard, the court
went on to give the following examples in which it would find that the standard
had not been met: "If [a director] has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his
duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious
danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of liability upon
him." Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. The commentators and cases which have concluded that the appropriate degree of culpability is gross negligence have focused
on the examples the court in Graham used because they all involve situations that
would support a gross negligence finding. On the other hand, the commentators
who espouse the ordinary negligence standard focus on the ordinary prudent person standard enumerated in Graham and the fact that the examples are just that,
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The liability of directors for failure to exercise proper supervision or control over corporate affairs will depend on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case.2 4 The variables that the court
considers in determining whether a board met the ordinary prudent person standard and should have taken action in a particular
situation include: the size of the corporation, its geographical location, the number of individuals employed, the type of business engaged in, the general degree of supervision and knowledge of the
board with respect to corporate matters, and the gravity and knowledge of the board concerning the specific matter that the board did
25
not act upon.
Even assuming that a challenging shareholder establishes that
the ordinary prudent person standard has not been met and the
directors were negligent in failing to act, the shareholder must also
prove causation and damages.2 6 Moreover, even if the challenging
shareholder establishes all of the elements of a duty of care claim,
section 102(b) (7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a corporation to relieve its directors from any monetary liability for a breach of duty of care if the corporation's certificate of
27
incorporation contains an exculpatory provision.
examples. Of course, the examples would also result in liability under an ordinary
negligence test.
24. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130; Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, No. CIVA.11273, 1992
WL 81228, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 1992) (stating corporate director's liability for
corporate losses depends on circumstances). In Graham for example, the court
found that the directors were not liable for neglect of duties because the corporation employed over 30,000 people located across the country. Graham, 188 A.2d at
130. Because of the sheer size of the corporation, the directors could not be expected to have knowledge of every little aspect of corporate action. Id.
25. See generally Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-24 (N.J.
1981) (describing basic responsibilities of directors under ordinary prudent person standard); Bayless Manning, The BusinessJudgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1499-1500 (1984) (describing basic
responsibilities of directors in performing their oversight function).
Directors are permitted to reasonably rely in good faith on information, reports and statements provided by board committees, officers, employees and exSerts as long as the reliance is reasonable and in good faith. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
141(e) (1974 & Supp. 1994).
26. See Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 370-71 (Del. 1993) (holding proof of injury is
not required for breach of fiduciary duty claim, but is required for tort action of
negligence).
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (1993). Section 102(b) (7) provides in
pertinent part that:
[The certificate of incorporation may contain a] provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
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Duty of Care When Business Decision is Made

As noted above, if the board makes a business judgment, the
business judgment rule provides that the board is presumed to have
met its fiduciary obligations when it made the decision. One of the
ways a shareholder can rebut that presumption is by showing that
the board breached its duty of care.
A shareholder can establish that the board violated its duty of
care by showing that the business decision was made in either an
uninformed or misinformed manner.28 In Delaware, the duty of
care requirement focuses on the procedure that the board followed
in reaching its decision. Specifically, the board's duty of care requires that the board obtain all material information reasonably
29
available to it when making the decision.
In Delaware, mere negligence does not rebut the business
judgment rule presumption that the board adequately informed itself (acted with due care) before making the business decision.
The Delaware courts have determined that gross negligence of the
board must be established in order for a shareholder to rebut the
30
business judgment rule based on a breach of the duty of care.
Thus, to rebut the business judgment rule's presumption, a challenging shareholder must establish that the board was grossly negligent in failing to obtain, or give due consideration to, all material
information reasonably available to it concerning the decision.3 1
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii)
under section 174 of this Title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
Id. For a further analysis of § 102(b) (7), see infra notes 103-105.
28. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 369-70 (holding duty of care element of business judgment rule formed by duty of directors to act on informed basis); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding challenger may rebut business
judgment rule by showing business judgment was uninformed); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (holding challenger may rebut business judgment rule by showing directors did not inform themselves of all material information reasonably
available).
29. Cede I, 634 A.2d at 367 (holding directors have duty to inform themselves
of all material information reasonably available) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812);
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
30. Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIVA.7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12
(Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) ("In the corporate context, gross negligence means 'reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders' or
actions which are 'without the bounds of reason."' (quoting Allaun v. Consolidated
Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929); Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316
A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974))); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 873 (holding gross negligence is proper standard for determining whether directors meet duty of care); Aronson, 472 A.2d at 812 (holding appropriate standard
is gross negligence).
31. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (holding challenging party must rebut pre-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 1

1308

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1297

The leading case in which the challenging shareholder overcame the business judgment rule's presumption that the directors
acted with due care is Smith v. Van Gor*om.32 In Van Gorkom, the
Supreme Court of Delaware found that the directors were grossly
negligent because they did not adequately inform themselves of all
the material information surrounding the sale of their company to
a third party.3 3
D. Duty of Loyalty
Another way in which a challenging shareholder can rebut the
sumption of informed business judgment); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (holding burden of establishing facts to rebut presumption is on challenger).
32. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
33. Id. The facts of Van Gorkom center around Trans Union, a diversified
holding company whose railcar leasing business generated an annual cash flow of
hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. at 864. Trans Union, however, "had difficulty
in generating sufficient taxable income to offset increasingly large investment tax
credits (ITCs)." Id. Trans Union's Board was comprised of outside directors with
extremely impressive backgrounds and inside directors with many years of experience. Id. at 880 n.21. Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, decided that a leveraged buy-out was a possible solution to
its tax credit problem. Id. at 865.
Van Gorkom met with Jay Pritzker, a "well-known corporate takeover specialist" to discuss the leveraged buy-out of Trans Union. Id. at 866. Van Gorkom proposed a price of $55 per share to Pritzker. Id. The court noted that "the record is
devoid of any competent evidence that $55 per share represented the per share
intrinsic value of the Company." Id. Pritzker was interested in the proposal. Id. at
867.
Although senior management reacted negatively to the proposal, Van
Gorkom took the proposal to a Special Meeting of the Trans Union board during
which he gave a 20 minute oral presentation on the proposed merger. Id. at 86768. According to the court, "[clopies of the proposed Merger Agreement were
delivered too late for study before or during the meeting." Id. at 868. Furthermore, the court stated that "Van Gorkom did not disclose to the Board . . . the
methodology by which he alone had arrived at the $55 figure." Id. AttorneyJames
Brennan advised the Board that "they might be sued if they, failed tb accept the
offer and that a fairness opinion was not required as a matter of law." Id. Trans
Union's Chief Financial Officer, Donald Romans, told the Board among other
things, "that his studies did not indicate either a fair price for the stock or a valuation of the Company." Id. at 868-69. Trans Union's President, Bruce Chelberg,
"supported Van Gorkom's presentation and representations." Id. at 869.
After a two hour meeting, and "[b]ased solely upon Van Gorkom's oral presentation, Chelberg's supporting representations, Romans' oral statement, Brennan's legal advice, and their knowledge of the market history of the Company's
stock," the directors approved the proposed Merger Agreement. Id.
The court found that the board breached their duty of care. The majority
decision brought a scathing dissent. The corporate bar's reaction to the decision
was unfavorable. Bayless Manning, Reflections and PracticalTips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985). Ultimately, the Delaware legislature
responded to the decision by permitting corporations to have a provision in their
certificate which limits the monetary liability of directors for breaches of the duty
of care. Id.
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business judgment rule is by showing that the board breached its
duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty component of the business judgment rule presumes that the board members who made the challenged decision had no conflict of interest that would affect their
ability to make a decision in the best interests of the corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court has carefully scrutinized situations
that involve potential conflicts of interest and has admonished that:
"Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to
use their position of trust and confidence to further their
private interests.... A public policy, existing through the
years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty,
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation,
or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make
in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there be no conflict between
duty and self-interest."

34

Delaware courts will not find a violation of the duty of loyalty if
35
at least a majority of the board is independent and disinterested.
Because the business judgment rule creates an initial presumption
that the board's decision is proper and the board had no duty of
loyalty problem, the burden is on the shareholder to establish that a
majority of the directors were interested or not independent. A director is not independent if the director's decisions are based on
any material considerations or influences other than the merits of
the decision to the corporation.3 6 A director is interested in a
34. Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939)); see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535

A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) ("[D]irectors must eschew any conflict between duty
and self-interest." (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983);
Guth, 5 A.2d at 510)).
35. Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994)
(holding directors on both sides of transaction are not independent and breach
duty of loyalty); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (holding dis-

interested and independent decision-maker essential to applicability of business
judgment rule).
36. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995)
(stating director acts independently when judgment based on merits to corpora-
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transaction if the director stands on both sides of the transaction or
derives a material personal financial benefit from it that is not
37
shared by the corporation or its stockholders.
One of the common situations in which challenging shareholders are able to rebut the business judgment rule based on director
interest occurs when the board member (or a controlling shareholder) stands on both sides of the transaction.38 In that situation,
the directors or the controlling shareholders are essentially negotiating with themselves. Interested director transactions 39 and par40
ent/subsidiary mergers exemplify this type of transaction.
A challenging party can also rebut the business judgment rule
based on a duty of loyalty problem by showing that a director receives a substantial personal benefit from the transaction not received by the shareholders as a group. 41 Other types of situations
tion and not extraneous influences); Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361 ("[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally."); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990) (holding independence means "director decision is
based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences"); Frantz Mfg. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408
(Del. 1985) (holding board acts with improper motive when acting to perpetuate
its own control); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding director cannot base decision on self-interest).
37. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 362 ("Classic examples of director self-interest in a
business transaction involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received by
the shareholders generally."); see also Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375 (holding director on
both sides of transaction violated duty of loyalty); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (holding director is interested if on both sides of transaction); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
710 (holding director on both sides of transaction breaches duty of loyalty); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952) (same).
38. For a further discussion of director interestedness, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
39. Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law defines an interested director transaction as a "contract or transaction between a corporation and
one or more of its directors ...or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which one or more of its

directors... are directors or officers, or have a financial interest."

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, § 144 (1974 & Supp. 1994).
40. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 939 (Del. 1985) (discussing
loyalty in parent-subsidiary relationship); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (same); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating parent owes duty
of loyalty to subsidiary during dealings); Sterling, 93 A.2d at 110 (discussing loyalty
in interested director transaction).
41. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 362; see Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375 ("I find it inherently
unfair for [the directors] to be purchasing key man life insurance in order to provide liquidity for themselves while providing no method by which [shareholders]
may liquidate their stock at fair value." (citation omitted)); Gilbert v. El Paso Co.,
575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990) (concluding board members did not "receive any
special benefit which was not also extended to all shareholders"); Aronson, 473
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which could also substantiate a finding of a disqualifying self-interest (i~e., disloyalty) include entrenchment motives and the selling of
42
one's vote.
Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a director's
self-interest must be material or substantial in order to disqualify
that director on the basis of disloyalty. 43 In ascertaining whether a
director's interest is material, the Delaware Supreme Court unequivocally rejected an objective reasonable person standard and
approved a subjective actual person standard. 44 The reasonable
person standard asks whether a reasonable person would have been
affected by the conflict. Under the subjective. actual person standard adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court, the question becomes whether the director making the decision was, in fact,
45
affected by the demonstrated conflict.

In short, there must be a form of self-interest which is material
or substantial enough to actually affect the judgment of the board
member and cause that board member to vote differently from the
way a disinterested director would have voted. The business judgment rule will be rebutted if the challenging party establishes that
at least a majority of the board making the decision had an actual
disqualifying self-interest.
A.2d at 812 (proclaiming directors cannot "derive any personal financial benefit"
from corporation transaction that is not available to all shareholders) (citing Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720; Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)); see also
EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREWJ. TuREzYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 141.2, at 88 (1996) ("If... a director-stockholder
uses his corporate office to advantage himself in a way denied to other stockholders, he has misused his office.").
42. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 362 (stating self-interest exists when directors receive
personal benefit from transaction not received by shareholders).
43. Id. at 363-66 (stating to show interest, shareholder must meet two-part
test).
44. Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995) (adopting "actual person" standard); Cede II, 634 A.2d at 364 (rejecting "reasonable person" standard).
45. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1167. The Chancellor in Cede III (affirmed by the
Delaware Supreme Court) indicated that the test would be whether the director
was or would likely be affected by the evidence of self-interest in such a way that
the director with the self-interest behaved differently than a reasonable (i.e., disinterested and independent) director would have acted. Id. (citing Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1151 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del.
1995)). The Chancellor noted that, in his opinion, a decision that a director was
not disloyal under a reasonable person standard normally would lead to the same
result ifra subjective actual person standard was used. Id. at 1168 n.22. According
to the Court of Chancery, "if a judge employing a reasonable person standard
concluded that in fact a director's judgment was affected by a factor or interest that
would not have affected a reasonableperson, it would be surprising if he would conclude that nevertheless there was no material conflict." Id. (citing Cinerama, 663
A.2d at 1152).
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A disqualifying self-interest on the part of one or more directors, but less than a majority of the board, does not automatically
rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of board loyalty.4 6
If the challenging party establishes an actual disqualifying self-interest in at least one, but less than a majority of directors, the business
judgment rule can still be rebutted. Such rebuttal is possible only if
the challenging party shows that the interested director "controls or
dominates the board as a whole or [that] the interested director
failed to disclose his interest in the transaction to the board and a
reasonable board member would have regarded the existence of
the material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the
proposed transaction. '47 This test requires a fact-intensive analysis
of the control or domination exerted by the interested director or
the materiality of that director's failure to disclose his interest on
48
the board's decision.
To summarize, the business judgment rule presumes and protects a decision made by an informed, neutral board. The business
judgment rule is rebutted when the board is neither neutral nor
properly informed. The board is considered not to be neutral if:
(1) a majority of the board is interested; (2) a majority of the board
is affected by another director's or controlling shareholder's selfinterest; (3) a majority of the board is dominated by an interested
director or controlling shareholder; or (4) an interested director
manipulates the decision-making process by failing to disclose material information to an otherwise disinterested majority of the
49
board.
46. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1170 (holding approval by disinterested or independent board subjects decision to business judgment rule in light of duty of loyalty);
Cede II, 634 A.2d at 364 (rejecting contention that less than majority of board
found to be interested, without evidence of disloyalty, is sufficient to rebut business
judgment rule).
47. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1153).
48. Cede II 634 A.2d at 364 ("We agree with defendants that the question of
when director self-interest translates into board disloyalty is a fact-dominated question, the answer to which will necessarily vary from case to case."); see Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (concluding
issue of whether board's decision was protected by business judgment rule is factdominated).
49. CedeIII,663 A.2d at 1170 n.25 (citations omitted); see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994) (concluding
if majority of directors are interested, board is not neutral decision-making body);
Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 955 (Del. 1992) (stating if interested
director dominates majority of board, board is not sufficiently "independent");
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) (concluding courts should refrain from reviewing "the wisdom and merits of a business
decision unless.., the decision. was not the product of an informed, disinterested,
and independent board"); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (coin-
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Duty of Good Faith

The business judgment rule presumes that directors act in
good faith. 50 Another way in which a challenging shareholder can
rebut the business judgment rule is by showing that the board did
not act in good faith.
Although courts frequently state that good faith is required for
a board to benefit from the protection of the business judgment
rule and plaintiffs often plead a lack of good faith, very few reported decisions discuss what constitutes good faith. One reason
for the dearth of decisions is that the good faith requirement often
overlaps with the fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care. In cases
where the duties overlap, the courts are usually inclined to rely
upon the well-defined duties of care and loyalty rather than the
more amorphous concept of good faith.
A decision is made in good faith if it was made "in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."5 1 Over time, courts have given meaning to the concept of
good faith primarily by discussing the type of conduct that constitutes bad faith. For example, bad faith exists "where the decision is
so beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any [other] ground." 52 Courts also have
noted that bad faith could exist if the board had an improper
mental state or an improper motive, such as entrenchment. 5 3
menting protection under business judgment rule requires disinterested and informed board of directors).
50. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (noting presumption that directors act in good
faith when making business decisions); see also Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1159 (holding
that in order for shareholder to rebut business judgment rule presumption, shareholder has burden to show breach of good faith); Unitrin v. American Gen. Corp.,
651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (stating presumption stands unless bad faith);
Citron, 569 A.2d at 64 (stating "presumption initially attaches to a director-approved transaction within a board's conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence of 'fraud, bad faith or selfdealing in the usual sense of
personal profit or betterment"' (quoting Growbow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187
(Del. 1988))); Arsht, supranote 23, at 660 (stating business judgment rule will not
attach if "directors' authorization of the transaction was not in good faith").
51. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating business judgment rule presumes directors acted "in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company") (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A. 26 (Del. Ch.
1924)); BLOCK ET AL., supra note 22, at 36 ("[G]ood faith ... requires conduct...
'in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."' (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
52. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 22, at 36 (citing In re Rexene Corp. Shareholders
Litig., Nos. CIVA.10897, 11300, 1991 WL 77529 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1991), aff'd sub
nom, Eichorn v. Rexene Corp., 604 A.2d 416 (Del. 1991)).
53. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, 624 A.2d
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Courts have also found fraudulent conduct, misconduct, abuse of
discretion and gross negligence to constitute bad faith. 54 Recently,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that bad faith focuses on the
state of mind of the actor, observing: "[B]ad faith. .. . implies the
conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity; ...it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating.
with furtive design or will." 55
F. Rational Business Purpose
If the business judgment rule is applicable and has not been
rebutted, the board's decisions "will not be disturbed if they can be
attributed to any rational business purpose."5 6 The rational business purpose test enables a shareholder to successfully challenge a
board's decision, when the directors acted with good faith, due care
and loyalty, but had no rational business purpose. 57 The shareholders challenging the decision have the burden of showing an
irrational business purpose. 58 This burden can be met by showing
1199, 1208 (Del. 1993) (defining bad faith by "party's tortious state of mind");
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating self-interest is violation of good
faith requirement); see also Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964) (stating
presumption of good faith rebutted by improper motive to retain control).
54. See Barkan v. Armstead Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (holding
good faith is belief board acted in best interests of corporation); In reJ.P. Stevens &
Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding bad faith
is 'judgment that seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad
faith").
55. Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1199 n.16 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 72
(5th ed. 1983)).
56. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971) (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 954 (Del. 1985)); see also In re Unitrin, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995) (holding business judgment
rule shields directors from personal liability where court concludes decision based
on rational business purpose); Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("The [business judgment rule] posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the
directors in that a decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts unless it cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."' (quoting Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720)); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207
(Del. 1991) (stating where rational business purpose exists, courts will not substitute their judgment for board's).
57. A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Fiduciary Obligations in the CorporateBoardroom: Recent Developments in Substantive BusinessJudgment Rule, 61 N.C. L. REv. 534, 537-38
(1983) (holding rational basis requirement "is designed to take care of the occasional outrageous corporate decision that somehow meets all the other criteria of
the business judgment rule"); E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of
the Counselor'sRole, 45 Bus. LAw. 2065, 2071 (1990) (equating egregious decision or
gross abuse of discretion with irrational business purpose); see also WELCH &
TuREzYN, supra note 41, § 141.26 (1996) (stating court can review business decision
to determine if decision is so far beyond reasonable judgment that cannot be explained except by bad faith).
58. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384 (Del. 1996) (stating presumption
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that the decision is based on fraud, abuse of discretion, waste or
impropriety. 5 9
Bad faith and lack of rational purpose overlap with the concepts of waste and corporate gift. 60 A claim of waste will be upheld
only if the shareholder shows that "the consideration received by
the corporation was so inadequate that no person of ordinary
sound business judgment would deem it worth the consideration
the corporation paid." 61 A shareholder makes a successful gift
claim if the board transfers assets of the corporation and receives
no benefit in return or the transfer was made for an improper purpose. 62 When the business judgment rule presumption of a valid
board action attaches to a challenged transaction, the court will invalidate the action upon a finding of waste or excessive gift just as it
would for irrationality. 63 In fact, we know of no case that applies
stands unless shareholder can prove burden that transaction is not based on rational business purpose).
59. Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980); 1 BALOTri &
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 22, § 4.7, at 4-57 (stating liability for irrational business
decisions can be based on bad faith, abuse of discretion, illegality or lack of rational business purpose); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988)
(noting absent fraud or unfairness, business judgment rule applies).
60. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch.
July 19, 1995) (mem.). According to the court in Steiner,
the waste theory represents a theoretical [situation] very rarely encountered in the world of real transactions. There surely are cases of fraud; of
unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence. But rarest of all
...
[and] possibly non-existent would be the case of disinterested business people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the
legal standard of waste!
Id.
61. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962); see also Rothenberg v.
Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. CIV.A.11749, 1995 WL 523599, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5,
1995). In Rothenberg, the court explained:
The second prong of Aronson addresses the circumstance where a majority of the directors, although disinterested and independent, nonetheless
approve a transaction that may not merit the protection of the business
judgment rule, either because (a) the directors acted without appropriate
due care, or (b) the transaction, on its face, appears to be so egregious or
"unsound" as to create a reasonable doubt that the business judgment
rule's protective presumptions apply. In this case the plaintiff does not
contend that the directors acted without due care; rather, his claim is that
the revised exchange offer ...

[is] corporate waste.

Id. (Citations omitted).
62. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (stating gift is lack of
consideration; waste is diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary
purpose).
63. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) (en banc) ("[A business] judgment normally will receive the protection of the business judgment rule
unless the facts show that such amounts ... constitute waste or could not otherwise
be the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." (citing Saxe, 184 A.2d at
610)); Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 501 (Del. Ch. 1990)
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the rationality standard to overrule a board decision unless gift,
64
waste or lack of good faith was found.
III.

EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT

RULE

ON THE STANDARD

OF REVIEW AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

As noted above, the shareholder challenging a business decision made by the board has the initial burden of rebutting the business judgment rule's presumption of valid board action. In order
to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, the challenging
shareholder will, depending on the procedural posture of the case,
present evidence or plead facts that could support the conclusion
that the directors have violated one or more of the three funda65
mental fiduciary duties.
If the challenging shareholder is unable to rebut the business
judgment rule because he fails to present persuasive facts that the
board breached any of its three primary fiduciary duties, then the
substantive component of the business judgment rule provides that
the business judgment is protected unless it was not rational. 66 The
challenging party has the extremely difficult burden of showing
that the board's decision was irrational.
On the other hand, if the shareholder presents evidence that
the directors breached any one of the three fundamental fiduciary
(stating where business judgment rule attaches, judicial review is limited to issues
of waste or gift) (citing Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987)).
64. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently stated:
It is to be remembered that, in cases where the business judgment rule is
applicable and the board acted with due care, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that they are acting in the best interests of the stockholders
...the Court gives great deference to the substance of the directors'
decision and will not invalidate the decision, will not examine its reasonableness, and will not substitute our views for those of the board if the
latter's decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985)
(citations omitted)).
65. Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("To rebut the rule, a shareholder
plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their
challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good
faith, loyalty or due care."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)
(stating "the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its business judgment was an informed one"); see Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. Ch. 1988) (concluding burden
rests with claimant to rebut presumption through evidence of director self-interest,
lack of good faith or failure to exercise due care) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
872).
66. For a discussion of the rational business purpose test, see supranotes 5664 and accompanying text.
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duties, the business judgment rule is rebutted and no longer protects the board's decision from close scrutiny. Rebutting the business judgment rule, however, does not per se invalidate the
decision or result in automatic board liability. 67 Rather, rebutting
the business judgment rule shifts the burden of proof to the directors. It also changes the standard of review to a higher level ofjudicial scrutiny in which the directors have the burden of establishing
that the challenged transaction was entirely fair to the
68
corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court has defined what constitutes entire fairness:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing
and fair price. The former embraces questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.
The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and
financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.... However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire
fairness. However, in a non-fraudulent transaction we recognize that price may be the preponderant consideration
outweighing other features of the merger.69
67. Cede 111, 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (holding burden shifting does
not create per se liability on defendant directors); Cede 17, 634 A.2d at 371 (same).
68. Cede Ii, 663 A.2d at 1162 (holding where plaintiffs rebut business judgment rule, directors must prove "entire fairness"); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995) (noting entire fairness applies when
business judgment rule rebutted); Cede 11, 634 A.2d at 361 (same); Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (holding where plaintiffs rebut business judgment rule, director's actions are reviewed under "entire fairness" standard); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (stating
interested directors must show entire fairness of transaction); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding when directors are on both sides of
transaction they must show "their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain").
69. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. If the contested transaction involves the sale

of the company, the "fair price" element of the entire fairness standard "requires
the board of directors to demonstrate 'that the price offered was the highest value
reasonably available under the circumstances."' CedeIII, 663 A.2d at 1163 (quoting
Cede I, 634 A.2d at 361).
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The fair dealing component of the entire fairness inquiry incorporates the board's duty of care. In evaluating whether the
board has dealt fairly with the corporation, the procedure that the
directors followed in making the challenged decision is very important. The court reviews whether the board manipulated the timing
of the transaction for its own benefit and not solely for the stockholders' benefit. 70 Further, the court considers whether there was
any unfairness in the manner in which the transaction was initiated
or negotiated. 7 1 The Delaware Supreme Court has indicated that if
the negotiation of the transaction is conducted by an independent
negotiator, such as an independent committee, this is a significant
72
indication that the transaction was entirely fair.
Even though the challenging shareholder, in rebutting the
business judgment rule, has established that at least one of the
three fundamental duties has been breached, each of the discrete
duties "retains independent substantive significance" in the entire
fairness analysis. 73 It is possible that a board can breach one or
more of its duties and still demonstrate entire fairness; perfection is
not required.7 4 In deciding whether the board has met its burden
70. Cede II, 663 A.2d at 1172. The court concluded that "the case sub judice
is not similar to one in which a fiduciary manipulated the timing of a transaction
to benefit itself at the stockholder's expense." Id.; see Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Del. 1985) (noting trial court accepted
plaintiff's contention that majority stockholder "breached its fiduciary duty of fair
dealing by purposely timing the merger, and thereby unfairly manipulating it");
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (concluding concept of fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained") (emphasis added); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,
509 A.2d 584, 599 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding merger transaction "was pursued and
authorized by the MGM Grand board at this time because it suited [defendant's]
plans and... not because the board determined that this was a particularly propitious moment to sell the Company").
71. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1172 (stating fair dealing aspect requires court to
examine how transaction was initiated and negotiated); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711
(same).
72. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1172 (holding arm's-length negotiation is strong evidence of entire fairness); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937-38 (Del.
1985) (same); Weinberger,457 A.2d at 712 (concluding that approval by majority of
minority was meaningless because, among other things, minority was unaware of
rushed timetable for ensuing transaction).
73. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1164 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 1165. In Cede III, the court noted:
[S]ince the evidence that defeated the procedural presumption of the
business judgment rule does not establish liability per se, a substantive finding of entire fairness is only possible after examining and balancing the
nature of the duty or duties the board breached vis-a-vis the manner in
which the board properly discharged its other fiduciary duties.
Id. (emphasis added). If perfection were the standard, then rebutting the busi-
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of entire fairness, the court balances the breach or breaches committed by the board with the manner in which the board properly
performed its other duties. In reaching a conclusion on whether
the board acted with entire fairness, the court takes into account
both what the board did right and what it did wrong.
If the board does not meet its burden to show that the transaction was entirely fair, then the shareholder still must establish causation and damages. 75 Damages are not necessarily limited to the
difference between what the corporation received and what the corporation would have received if the board had not breached its fiduciary duties. The court has the power to award all types of
equitable relief including rescissory damages. 76 Moreover, if the
nessjudgment rule would lead to per se liability since by definition the challenging
party established that the board violated at least one of the three fundamental
duties. Such a finding would of course preclude a finding of perfection. Cede III
and other cases make it absolutely clear that one or more of the duties can be
breached in a manner which rebuts the business judgment rule and the directors
can still meet their burden of entire fairness by a showing that even giving due
consideration to the established breach, the cumulative actions of the boardjustify
a finding of entire fairness. Id. at 1180. Such was the case in Cede III itself where
even though the board violated its duty of care, which had the effect of rebutting
the business judgment rule and shifting the burden on the directors to prove entire fairness, the court ultimately found that the directors had met their burden of
showing entire fairness. Id.
75. Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). The court in Cede II made it clear
that causation and damages are considered only after the liability of the board is
determined when it declared that the Court of Chancery "committed fundamental
error" in "inject[ing] into the duty of care element a burden of proof of resultant
injury or loss." Id. In other words, causation and damages are irrelevant as to
whether the business judgment rule has been rebutted or even strictly speaking
whether the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. Id. The Supreme
Court observed that: "This Court has consistently held that the breach of duty of
care, without any requirementof proof of injuy, is sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule." Id. (emphasis added); see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1267, 1280-81 (Del. 1988) (concluding any breach of fiduciary duty, "standing alone," defeats standard of fairness); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893
(Del. 1985) (suggesting proof of breach of duty of care was enough to rebut presumption of business judgment rule).
76. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 371 (concluding "the measure of any recoverable loss
by Cinerama under an entire fairness standard of review is not necessarily limited
to the difference between the price offered and the 'true' value as determined
under appraisal proceedings"). According to the Delaware Supreme Court, out of
pocket or benefit of the bargain losses are not the only form of equitable relief. See
Weinberger,457 A.2d at 714 (holding "the Chancellor's powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate, including
rescissory damages"). In Cede II, the court concluded that rescissory damages can
be incorporated into a fair price calculation if the elements are: "(1) susceptible
to proof; and (2) appropriate under the circumstances [of the case]." Cede II, 634
A.2d at 371 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429
A.2d 497, 501-02 (Del. 1981). The court in Lynch stated:
On the present state of affairs, we conclude that a fair result can be
accomplished without interfering with the present corporate structure
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corporation's certificate contains a provision which complies with
section 102(b) (7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law eliminating the board's liability for breaches of the duty of care, the challenging shareholder will not be able to recover damages for duty of
77
care breaches.
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that "'[b] ecause
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is
so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review fre78
quently is determinative of the outcome of' [the] litigation.'
Consequently, if the challenging party is unable to rebut the business judgment rule, the challenging party will most likely lose because it will be extremely difficult for him to prove that the board's
decision cannot be attributable to any rational business purpose. If
the challenging party is successful in rebutting the business judgment rule, however, the challenging party will most likely win the
liability portion of the case because the board usually will not be
able to meet the onerous burden of establishing that its decision
was entirely fair. If the board meets its burden and demonstrates
that the decision it made was entirely fair to the corporation, then
injunctive relief will be denied and the directors will not be liable.
IV. LIABiLITY

FOR LACK OF DISCLOSURE

When seeking stockholder action, directors and controlling
shareholders 79 owe a fiduciary obligation to disclose all material
facts known to them. 0 This duty of disclosure is derived from the
through a rescission order. That can be accomplished by ordering damages which are the monetary equivalent of rescission and which will, in
effect, equal the increment in value that Vickers enjoyed as a result of
acquiring and holding Trans Ocean stock in issue. That is consistent with
the basis for liability which is the law of the case, and it is a norm applied
when the equitable remedy of rescission is impractical. .

.

. "[R]ecision

[sic] calls for cancellation of the bargain, and the return of the parties to
the status quo ante where this is impossible because of the disposal or
retirement of the stock, then equivalent value of the stock at the time of
resale or at the time of judgment, should be the proper measure of
damages."
Id. at 501-02 (quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967)).
77. For a discussion of board liability, see supranotes 67-76, infra notes 98-108
and accompanying text.
78. Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1163 n.8 (citing Mills, 559 A.2d at 1279 (quoting AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986))).
79. For a discussion of what constitutes a controlling shareholder, see infra
section V.
80. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 66 (Del. 1995)
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primary duties of care and loyalty.
The failure of the board to disclose all material facts when it
seeks shareholder approval may constitute either a breach of the
duty of care or the duty of loyalty. It will be a breach of the duty of
loyalty only when the failure to disclose occurs in a transaction that
would otherwise be subject to an entire fairness standard of review
because of duty of loyalty violations. In a transaction where duty of
loyalty problems are implicated, the duty to disclose is an element
of the fair dealing prong of the entire fairness standard. In a transaction which is not subject to an entire fairness analysis, failure to
disclose is a breach of the board's duty of care.
In order for a breach of the duty of disclosure to occur, the
alleged omission or misrepresentation must be material.8 1 The definition of "materiality" in Delaware is well-settled. In Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 82 the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the standard
for materiality previously used by the United States Supreme Court
in TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,8 3 a case involving securities
fraud claims brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10(b) (5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In TSC Industries, the United
States Supreme Court defined materiality as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote....

What the standard

[contemplates] is a showing of a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of
the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must
(stating board has duty to disclose material information) (citing Zirn v. VLI Corp.,
621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993)); Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114
(Del. 1992) (same); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (same); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (same).
An important case discussing the nature and scope of the duty is Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978), in which the court held that a controlling stockholder "owed a fiduciary duty ... which required 'complete candor'
in disclosing fully 'all the facts and circumstances surrounding the' tender offer."
Id. at 279 (quoting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 573 (Del. Ch.

1976)). See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 88 (Del.
1995) (recognizing existence of fiduciary duty of disclosure); Arnold v. Society for

Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994) ("'[D]irectors of Delaware
corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action."') (quoting
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84).
81. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 66; Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1277 (citing Stroud, 606
A.2d at 84); Shell, 606 A.2d at 114.
82. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
83. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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be a substantial likelihood that, the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made, available .,

4

When determining whether an omission or misrepresentation is
material, Delaware courts decide whether the information would be
material from the perspective of a reasonable stockholder.8 5
Directors and controlling stockholders must fully disclose all
the material facts they know and supplement previously disclosed
information if the board thereafter learns of new material facts after the prior disclosure. 6 The board, however, is not required to
disclose every material fact to stockholders in all situations. 8 7 Facts
that are generally known to shareholders need not be specifically
84. Id. at 449. See also Lynch Communications'Sys., 669 A.2d at 88 (noting TSC
Industries/Rosenblatt standard); In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 66 (same); Arnold, 650
A.2d at 1277 (same); Zirn, 621 A.2d at 778-79 (same).
85. Lynch CommunicationsSys., 669 A.2d at 88 (holding materiality is objective
standard); Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1277 (citing Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779 (noting reasonable shareholder is appropriate standard)); Shell 606 at 114 (holding proper standard determined from viewpoint of reasonable shareholder). This requirement
follows from the materiality test developed in TSC Industries, which focuses on
whether the omission of material information would have substantially affected the
reasonable shareholder's decision-making abilities. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
The question is not whether the information would actually change the shareholder's decision, but whether the information would be relevant to him or her.
E.g., Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1277 ("Courts should not assess the qualitative importance
of a particular item.") (citations omitted); Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779; Shell, 606 A.2d at
114 ("'While it need not be shown that an omission or distortion would have made
an investor change his overall view of a proposed transaction, it must be shown
that the fact in question would have been relevant to him."' (quoting Barkan v.
Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1289 (Del. 1989))).
The court has found several types of omissions to be material. Arnold, 650
A.2d at 1281 (holding omission of genuine auction bid in relaying of history of
merger negotiation is material); Shel4 606 A.2d at 115 (holding cash flow understatement of one billion dollars from oil reserves is material omission); Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1978) (holding ceiling price and
ceiling asset value material). Conversely, the court has found other omissions to
be immaterial. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 66 (holding omission of board's zeal in
negotiating transaction and information comparing and contrasting merger to hypothetical immaterial); Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1282 (holding investment advisor's
forecasted value, based on uncertain variables, need not be disclosed because too
speculative to be material); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 847
(Del. 1987) (holding absent actual agreement omissions of corporation's efforts to
arrange mergers are immaterial); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 222 (Del.
1979) (holding alleged terms and intent of stock option plan immaterial).
86. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1276, 1280 (holding once directors made partial disclosure, "they had an obligation to provide ... an accurate, full, and fair characterization ... of events") (citations omitted).
87. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. CIVA.12324, 1995 WL 600881, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 22, 1995).
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disclosed. 88 In addition, 'a board may withhold material information that could 'mislead a shareholder.8 9 When withholding information on this basis, directors are required to carefully balance the
benefits that would be gained from disclosure against the harm it
could cause. 90 Directors also have no obligation to speculate about
the future 9 ' or engage in self-flagellation. 9 2 Furthermore, disclosure of highly sensitive information may be conditioned upon the
93
shareholders agreeing to a reasonable confidentiality agreement.
In reviewing nondisclosure claims, the courts place more emphasis on what the shareholders know than on the form in which
they receive the information. The directors are not required to
make the best or optimal disclosure, but are required to inform
shareholders fully and fairly of all material facts pertaining to the
95
transaction. 94 In In re Santa Fe Pacic Corp. ShareholderLitigation,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that disclosure which sufficiently
apprises shareholders of all pertinent issues, without making material misstatements, satisfies the duty of disclosure even though the
96
directors failed to disclose all available information.
Delaware law does not appear to require disclosure of material
88. Lynch Communications Sys., 669 A.2d at 89 (citing Seibert v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A.6639, 1984 WL 21874 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984)). In
Lynch Communications Sys., the Delaware Supreme Court held that although more
specific language in a proxy statement may have been more informative to shareholders in explaining corporate options, such additional, specific disclosure was
not necessary to adequately describe the material facts affecting the shareholders.

Id.
89. Id. (noting information board recognizes as being unreliable or potentially misleading to investor may be withheld by board) (citing Weinberger v. Rio
Grand Indus., 519 A.2d 116, 128-29 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
90. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1279 (stating materiality requires balancing of possible
harm against potential benefit).
91. Id.
92. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del. 1992) (stating board not required to engage in self-flagellation) (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 89 ("If the board withheld information in these special circumstances, it would still bear the burden of proving that: (1) the withheld information was confidential; and (2) the board only withheld the material confidential
information from shareholders, who having been given notice and opportunity,
failed to execute a reasonable confidentiality agreement.").
94. See Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. CIVA.9488, 1995 WL 362616, at *4 (Del. Ch.
June 12, 1995) ("[W]hile all material information in a company's possession must
be disclosed when the board seeks shareholder action, the law ought guard against
the fallacy that increasingly detailed disclosure is always material and beneficial
disclosure. In some instances the opposite will be true.").
95. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
96. Id. at 66. The court, considering the adequacy of disclosures contained in
a proxy statement, held that a statement which apprises shareholders of pertinent
facts is sufficient to overcome a breach of disclosure claim, regardless of whether
or not the directors could have made a better disclosure. Id.
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information about general material developments affecting the
company's business, unless the board affirmatively seeks the vote of
the shareholders in a transaction related to that aspect of the company's business. 9 7 When shareholder approval of a transaction is
not sought, no disclosure is required and the board will have no
liability for failure to disclose properly even if disclosure is made.
For example, in Kahn v. Roberts,98 the board attempted to repurchase a portion of its own stock in a transaction in which shareholder approval was not required or sought. Even though the
board made incomplete and misleading disclosures about the transaction in the corporation's annual report, the Vice-Chancellor
found no breach of the duty of disclosure. 99 This holding in Kahn,
however, appears to conflict with the generally accepted tort principle that once a fiduciary makes a disclosure, he has a duty to ensure
that the disclosure is complete and truthful, regardless of whether
shareholder action is sought.1 00
The duty of disclosure requires not only that directors disclose
all material facts within their possession, but also requires that
shareholders or directors who ratify board action be fully informed
97. See Kahn v. Roberts, No. CIVA.12324, 1995 WL 745056, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 6, 1995) (stating Delaware law does not require disclosure of material developments regarding company business where shareholder approval is neither
needed nor sought) (citing Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., No. CW.A.11365,
1990 WL 193326, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990)). In Raskin, Chancellor Allen
stated:
The state law duty of candor arises when the board elects to or has a duty
to seek shareholder action .... If the board does not seek shareholder
action at a meeting, through consent, in a tender or exchange offer, or
otherwise, it has, in my opinion, no distinctive state law duty to disclose
material developments with respect to the company's business.
Raskin, 1990 WL 193326, at *5. However, federal security laws requiring complete
disclosure may govern in some situations where a transaction does not require
shareholder approval, even though Delaware law will not require disclosure. Roberts, 1995 WL 745056, at *8-9.
98. No. CIVA.12324, 1995 WL 745056, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995).
99. Id. at *9.
100. See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del.
1994) (holding once directors made partial disclosure of material facts, they were
under obligation to provide shareholders with complete and accurate portrayal of
material information); Kahn v. Roberts, No. CIV.A.12324, 1994 WL 70118, at *2
(Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1994) (stating once directors decide voluntarily to make disclosure where shareholder approval is not needed, they become subject to duty of full
disclosure of all material facts); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc., No. CIV.A.9212,
1990 WL 135923, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990) (same).
Although the Delaware opinions suggest that there would be no liability for
not disclosing under fiduciary principles, there could still be a potential cause of
action for equitable fraud if the party receiving the false or incomplete information reasonably relied on that information to its detriment. See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI,
Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778, 783 (Del. 1993).
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of all material facts regarding the transaction. 10 1 Problems can
arise when material facts exist that the board should have known
but did not. Effective shareholder ratification requires the full disclosure of all material facts that the board knows or should have
known.102

As noted above, the certificate of incorporation can contain a
provision that protects the board from monetary liability for
breaches of the duty of care, presumably including those arising
from inadequate disclosure.10 3 By its terms, section 102(b) (7) will
not protect any director who committed a breach of the duty of
loyalty, failed to act in good faith or engaged in an act of intentional misconduct.1 0 4 Because this section only protects directors
for duty of care violations, not duty of loyalty breaches, bad faith or
101. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 220 (Del. 1979) (stating shareholder ratification only valid where shareholders are fully informed); see also Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors owe duty to
fully inform themselves of all material facts relating to transactions affecting corporation and shareholders as part of their duty of care).
102. Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 280 (Del. 1995) (noting ratification can only occur if stockholders are fully informed); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (same); Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of Cal., No.
CIV.A.5915, 1983 WL 20290, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) ("There must be full
disclosure of all germane facts in order to have a meaningful stockholder
ratification.").
The burden of proof rests on the party claiming ratification to establish that it
made meaningful disclosure. E.g. Yiannatsis, 653 A.2d at 280; WELCH c TuREzYN,
supra note 41, § 144.5.2, at 235 (noting burden rests on party claiming
ratification).
103. Since the duty of disclosure was recognized in Delaware law when
§ 102(b) (7) was enacted, the drafters probably intended the section to act as a
potential shield against claims of breach of the duty of disclosure derived from due
care violations. The court in Arnold found that the language of the statute was
ambiguous and that examination of legislative history regarding the scope of
§ 102(b) (7) was unnecessary. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1286-87. Because § 102(b) (7)
provides that breaches of fiduciary duties are protected except for breaches of
loyalty, and because the fiduciary duty of disclosure was recognized by the courts
and legislature when § 102(b) (7) was enacted, § 102(b) (7) must be read to bring
the duty of disclosure within its protections. Id.
104. Id. at 1287 (stating under § 102(b) (7), directors liable for acts in bad
faith or internal misconduct); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. CIVA.9600,
1995 WL 600881, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1995) (stating protections of
§ 102(b) (7) apply to omissions by directors made in good faith belief that they
were immaterial or so speculative as to be considered potentially misleading to
reasonable investors).
Although § 102(b) (7) can bar individual director liability, it is possible that a
director could waive the protection afforded by such a provision. See Arnold, 650
A.2d at 1289. In Arnold, the court did not directly state that the protections of
§ 102(b) (7) could be waived, but rather, assumed that waiver was possible only
because the parties had agreed to the concept. Id. & 1289 n.38. Accepting the
parties' stipulations that § 102(b) (7) protections could be waived under Delaware
law, the court in Arnold stated that to waive the protections of § 102(b) (7), the
director must assert such intention clearly and unambiguously. Id. at 1288.
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intentional misconduct, it is imp6rtantto determine whether the
failure to disclose breached the duty of care or duty of loyalty. A
section 102(b) (7) provision would protect directors from liability
105
for nondisclosures in the former case, not the latter.
Delaware courts have held that damages need not be proven to
make a prima facie case of a breach of the duty of disclosure. 10 6 In
fact, Delaware courts have developed a virtual per se rule that
awards at least nominal damages for a breach of the duty of disclosure.1 0 7 Of course, Delaware courts will also award actual damages,
if proven, in recognition of the value of the right of the stockholder
10 8
to make informed decisions regarding corporate affairs.
Thus, the duty of disclosure can impact a shareholder challenge of a board decision in a number of ways. Failure to disclose
material facts will rebut the business judgment rule's presumption
of propriety. A disclosure violation usually results in a virtual per se
breach of fiduciary duty and at least some liability on the board's
part. Full disclosure is also a prerequisite to effective shareholder
ratification.
V.

LIABILITY FOR OTHER FIDUCIARIES: DE FACTO

& DE JURE

CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS

In certain situations, a stockholder will have fiduciary obligations very similar to a director's duties. A stockholder will owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and other shareholders if he has
either de jure or de facto control over corporate matters. 10 9 A
105. Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 & n.18 (Del. 1995) (noting cases prior to
adoption of § 102(b) (7) did not determine if disclosure breach fell under duty of
loyalty or care); Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1287 ("[C]laims alleging disclosure violations
that do not otherwise fall within any exception are protected by Section
102(b) (7)."); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1992) (noting legislative
history indicates § 102(b)(7) shields directors in breach of care and disclosure
cases, but not in breach of loyalty cases).
106. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 463 (Del. 1991) (explaining proof of
special damages need not be shown in duty of loyalty actions because such actions
often embrace disclosure claims as well).
107. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. CIV.A.5642, 1985 WL 11546, aff'd, 497
A.2d 792 (Del. 1985). In Weinberger, the court stated that plaintiffs should be compensated for wrongs done to them even though valuation of the damage incurred
cannot be easily ascertained. Id. at *9.
108. In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 334 (Del. 1993). In In re
Tri-Star, the court found that nondisclosure by the board led to a diminution in
the value of the plaintiffs' shares, a result that may not have occurred had the
shareholders been presented with adequate disclosure. Id.
109. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987) (stating "shareholder owes fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest
and exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation") (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
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shareholder is a de jure controlling shareholder if he owns more
than fifty percent of the voting shares in the corporation."10 A
shareholder who owns less than a majority of the voting stock can
be a de facto controlling shareholder -if the shareholder exercises
actual control over the business affairs of the corporation., t
A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)). Control is vital for a stockholder to owe fiduciary
duties. Donald E. Pease, Delaware'sDisclosure Rule: The "Complete Candor" Standard,
Its Application, and Why Sue in Delaware, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 445, 455 (1989).
"Under Delaware law a stockholder has fiduciary obligations only if it is a controlling stockholder. A stockholder is not deemed controlling unless it owns a majority of the stock ... or has exercised actual domination and control in directing the
corporation's business affairs." In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., No.
CIVA.8453, 1988 WL 49126, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1988) (citations omitted).
Several factors exist for determining whether a stockholder controls a corporation and, therefore, owes other stockholders fiduciary duties. These factors
include:
1. The magnitude of [the stockholder's] ownership interest.
2. The number of [the stockholder's] nominees on the board.
3. The degree of independence demonstrated by [the stockholder's]
nominees and other directors.
4. A comparison of how the stockholder and other stockholders have
voted on various matters.
5. The degree to which the interests of the stockholder have affected
corporate acts.
6. The overall relationship between the stockholder and the corporation's directors and management.
Pease, supra at 455-56 (quoting Steven J. Rothschild & Keith R. Sattesahn, "All
Germane Facts with Complete Candor"--Delaware'sDisclosure Duty, in DELAWARF LAW
FOR CORPORATE LAWYERS & RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 332 (PLI 1985)).
110. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344 (stating shareholder who owns majority owes
fiduciary interest duty); see In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1204-05 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating board members in Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992), who owned majority of corporation's stock were de
jure controlling stockholders). In Weinberger, the court applied the entire fairness
standard to a cash-out merger involving a corporation and its 50.5% shareholder.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983). The court applied the
entire fairness test, rather than the business judgment rule, to the proposed
merger, thereby implicitly recognizing that a 50.5% stockholder possessed dejure
control over corporate affairs. Id. Similarly, the court in Stroud stated that the
directors, as holders of a majority of the outstanding stock, controlled the affairs of
the corporation, and proceeded to use the entire fairness standard of review which
typically applies to determine the propriety of a transaction between a corporation
and controlling stockholder. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 90.
111. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344 (stating shareholder who exercises control
owes fiduciary duty); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53,
70 (Del. 1989) ("For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination by a minority shareholder
through actual control of corporate conduct." (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284
A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971)); see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638
A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) (noting ownership of less than majority of stock alone
is insufficient to establish shareholder control (citing Citron, 569 A.2d at 70)); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984) (citing Osofsky v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., Inc., 725 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1984)); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16
(holding ownership of 47% of stock of publicly held corporation does not constitute control absent allegation by particularized facts that 47% stockholder domi-
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De facto control exists only where the minority shareholder
dominates corporate decision-making through the actual exercise of
control over corporate action. ' 12 The mere potential for control by
a minority stockholder is insufficient to constitute de facto control
over corporate affairs."13 For example, the presence of a supermajority provision in the certificate of incorporation may support a
finding that a stockholder who owns less than a majority of a corporation's stock exercises control over corporate affairs. 1 14 Similarly,
nated and controlled corporation's board of directors). Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 122-23
(stating term "control" implies "a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as
to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the
controlling") (citations omitted).
112. See Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d at 1115 (stating controlling stock
ownership may exist when minority interest stockholder exercises "actual control"
over corporation by dominating corporate affairs); In re Sea-Land, 1984 WL 49126,
at *3 (stockholder owes fiduciary duties only if stockholder "exercised actual domination and control over [the corporation's] directors"); Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 123
(stating terms "control" and "domination" imply actual exercise of conduct by
stockholder in accordance with stockholder wishes for corporation direction);
Pease, supra note 109, at 454 (stating mere power to control is not sufficient to
trigger fiduciary duty of disclosure, rather actual exercise of power is necessary).
113. Zlotnick v. Newell Cos., No. CIVA.7246, 1984 WL 8242, at *2 (Del. Ch.
July 30, 1984) (holding "[c]ontrolling stock ownership may exist even in the absence of a numerical majority but in such event there must be domination by a
minority shareholder through actual exercise of direction over corporate conduct"
(citing Liboff v. Allen, No. CIVA.2669, 1975 WL 1961 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1975);
Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 119))).
Applying this principle, the Chancery Court in Zlotnick held that a 33% shareholder who had arguably paid a control premium, was nevertheless not a de facto
controlling stockholder because the stockholder did not exercise actual control
over corporate affairs. Zlotnick, 1984 WL 8242, at *2. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that one could infer that the 33% stockholder had obtained control
over the corporation because it had paid $2.5 million over market value for the
stock, the excess constituting payment of a control premium. Id. The court determined that the 33% ownership, on its own, did not constitute control, and that the
price paid for stock had no relation to whether stock ownership was used to influence corporate policy. Id. The "lurking threat emanating from substantial stock
ownership" is not enough, standing alone, to indicate that a stockholder exercises
control over corporate affairs. Id. Although the stockholder may have paid a premium for the stock in order to gain control, until it exercises such ownership in a
way that it gains control over corporate affairs, or it works to the detriment of the
other shareholders, the stockholder merely possesses a potential for control and
owes no fiduciary duty to the other shareholders. Id.
114. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d at 1114-15 (holding supermajority
provision allowed minority shareholder to exercise control); see also Unitrin, Inc. v.
American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377, 1383 (Del. 1995) (holding in light of
75% supermajority provision in corporate charter and adoption of poison pill by
corporation, 14.9% stockholder could achieve control over corporate affairs
through proxy contest where less than 100% turnout could be expected); Citron,
569 A.2d at 70 (holding minority stockholder may still exercise control if that
stockholder dominates corporation through actual control of corporation's existence) (citing Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 122-23).
In Lynch Communication Sys., the 43.3% stockholder, Alcatel Corporation (Alcatel), had agreed not to increase its stock ownership in Lynch above 45% for a
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the existence of voting agreements which result in the shareholders
exercising actual control over corporate matters can create a controlling stockholder situation.' 1 5 On the other hand, a stockholder
making a tender offer for a majority of the corporation's voting
stock, despite his potential for control over corporate conduct if the
offer is successful, will not be deemed to have acquired control unperiod of five years in return for the inclusion of the supermajority provision.
Lynch Communications Sys., 638 A.2d at 1112. In 1986, Lynch determined that it
would be in the corporation's best interests to expand into the field of fiber optics
technology and identified a target company. Id. Alcatel disapproved of the choice

and recommended a combination with an indirect subsidiary of Alcatel's parent
company. Id. An independent committee was formed and subsequently recommended that Alcatel's proposed combination be denied. Id. at 1113. After the five
year period expired, Alcatel responded to the independent committee's recommendation by offering to acquire the remaining 56.7% of Lynch shares not in its

possession for $14 per share. Id. Alcatel entered into negotiations with the independent committee and made a final offer of $15.50 per share, stating that if

that proposal were not accepted, Alcatel would proceed with an unfriendly tender
offer at a lower price. Id. Based on Alcatel's "threat," the independent committee
unanimously recommended that the Lynch board approve the $15.50 per share
merger. Id. A representative for Alcatel told a member of Lynch's independent

committee: "You must listen to us. We are 43 percent owner. You have to do what
we tell you." Id. The court determined that the negotiations between Alcatel and

the independent committee represented Alcatel's leverage over Lynch's operations, demonstrating that Alcatel knew that the supermajority provision allowed it

to control Lynch's business conduct. Id. at 1114-15. Thus, the court concluded
that due to the supermajority provision, the Lynch board was "handcuffed" by Alcatel's equity position and that the Lynch board had accepted the merger proposal
solely because of Alcatel's position as a significant stockholder. Id. Even though
Alcatel possessed a minority interest in Lynch, the court held that it exercised actual control over Lynch and dominated its corporate affairs. Id.
115. In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993). In In re
Ti-Star,Coca-Cola was the largest single shareholder, holding 36.8% of Tri-Star's
outstanding stock. Id. at 321. However, it proceeded to enter into voting agreements with Home Box Office (HBO), which owned 9% of Tri-Star common stock,
Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor), which owned 7.2% of Tri-Star common stock,
and Rank American, Inc. (Rank), which owned 3.6% of Tri-Star common stock, to
effectively exercise control over 56.6% of Tri-Star common stock. Id. at 321-22,
328. The court stated that as a result of the voting agreements Coca-Cola "affirmatively attempted to dictate the destiny of Tri-Star." Id. at 328. Along with the implementation of voting agreements, Coca-Cola and HBO had entered into a
shareholder agreement whereby they agreed to support each other's choices for
election to the Tri-Star board. Id. at 328. The court saw this agreement as further
evidence of Coca-Cola's control. Id. Additionally, because Tri-Star's seven directors were either senior executives, affiliates or substantial stockholders in CocaCola, the court concluded that Coca-Cola exercised control over Tri-Star's affairs.
Id. at 328-29.
Because the threshold for control is a stockholder's ability to dictate the
destiny of the particular corporation, the existence of voting agreements, designed
and controlled by a "minority" shareholder, can put the shareholder in a position
where he or she can effectively control the business decisions of the corporation.
Id. In such a case, the stockholder assumes a fiduciary duty to all of the corporation's stockholders. Id.
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til the tender offer is successfully consummated. 116

VI.

DERIVATIVE CHALLENGES TO BOARD ACTION

Decision-making power concerning corporate litigation generally resides solely in the board.1 17 In certain situations, a board may
be reluctant to assert a corporate claim that could result in director
liability.1 1 8 In these situations, the law permits a shareholder to
assert the corporate claim. Shareholder lawsuits that assert claims
on behalf of the corporation are called "derivative actions." Derivative actions permit shareholders to sue the parties, including directors and controlling shareholders, who caused injury to the
corporation.1 1 9
A derivative action is two suits in one.1 20 First, the derivative
action requires that the shareholder establish standing to assert the
116. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055-56 (Del. 1990) (holding
offeror does not acquire control of corporate affairs when sufficient number of
shares is deposited, but rather acquires control only after offeror owns those
shares).
117. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194,200 (Del. 1991) (holding decision
to litigate or refrain from litigation is management decision given to board under
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974 & Supp. 1994)); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571
A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990) (same); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 782 (Del. 1981) ("[D]irectors are responsible for deciding whether to engage
in derivative litigation.").
118. Levine, 591 A.2d at 200 (noting derivative suit is remedy for conflicts between director's duties to manage and shareholder's claim of right to enter derivative claim); Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988)
(noting that shareholders' ability to institute suit inherently impinges on directors'
power to manage affairs of corporation).
119. See, e.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992)
(holding derivative suit is equitable remedy where shareholder asserts claim on
behalf of corporation); Levine, 591 A.2d at 200 (same); Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773
(holding shareholder may file derivative action to redress harm to corporation);
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (noting derivative suit enables
shareholders to sue in corporate name where board refuses to assert claim); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (same).
In some situations, a stockholder wishing to avoid the procedural hurdles of a
derivative action may be able to bring a direct action. While a derivative action is
brought based on a harm done to the corporation, a direct action is brought for
harm done to the individual stockholder, separate from injuries done to the stockholders collectively. Although it is often difficult to determine whether a claim is
direct or derivative, the courts have attempted to distinguish the two. The recent
en banc decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1206 (Del. 1996), gives important insight into the difference between derivative
and direct actions.
120. See, e.g., Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773 (stating derivative suit is "suit by shareholders to compel corporation to sue"); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (noting two
prongs of shareholder derivative suit); Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784 (same).
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claim on the corporation'si behalf.12 1 If the shareholder successfully establishes standing to sue in the first phase, the second phase
of the action is the prosecution of the underlying substantive claim
brought by the shareholder on the corporation's behalf against
122
those allegedly liable to the corporation.
A.

Standing to Sue

In derivative litigation, the initial question is whether the
shareholder has standing to sue on behalf of the corporation. 23 A
board can contest standing by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1.124
Courts are sensitive to the possibility that shareholders might
abuse the derivative action by bringing a strike suit or bringing a
suit that is not in the best interests of the corporation. The derivative action, brought and controlled by a stockholder, necessarily impinges on the board's general plenary responsibilities concerning
corporate litigation. 125 Thus, Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1
121. Levine, 591 A.2d at 200 (stating that in derivative suit, shareholder asserts
claim on behalf of corporation).
122. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12 (stating second phase derivative action is suit
by shareholders on behalf of corporation).
123. Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1275 (Del. Ch. 1981) (noting in addition to being shareholder, plaintiff in derivative action must have standing). In
determining whether the shareholder is a suitable plaintiff, the court will consider
a number of factors including: economic antagonisms between representatives
and the class; the remedy sought by the plaintiff in the derivative litigation; indications that the named plaintiff was not the driving force behind the litigation; the
existence of other litigation pending between the plaintiff and defendant; the relative magnitude of plaintiff's personal interests as compared to his or her interest
in the derivative action itself; the plaintiff's vindictiveness toward the defendant;
and the degree of support the plaintiff was receiving from the shareholders he or
she purportedly represents. See Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 (6th
Cir. 1980) (discussing who is suitable derivative plaintiff); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 564 A.2d 670, 673 (Del. Ch. 1989) (noting plaintiff in derivative action must be
qualified to serve in fiduciary capacity); Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376,
379-80 (Del. Ch. 1983) (same).
124. Rule 23.1 states in pertinent part:
In a derivative action brought by 1 or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was
a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the
plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership thereafter
devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law. The complaint shall also
allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain
the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority
and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort.
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (1996).
125. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990) (noting de-
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and the judicial decisions concerning derivative actions require
shareholders to exhaust intracorporate remedies before suing derivatively. 126 Derivative shareholder plaintiffs must make a pre-suit
demand on the board to assert the underlying claim or show that
127
such a demand would be futile.
Frequently, conflicts of interest for the board arise because the
shareholder's claim is that the directors have breached their fiduciary obligations to the corporation. In ascertaining whether the
board is capable of making an unbiased determination regarding
the lawsuit, the court will look beyond the fact that the directors are
simply named as defendants and try to ascertain whether the directors have a significant risk of exposure to liability on the underlying
claim.
rivative suit "'could, if unrestrained, undermine the basic principle of corporate
governance that the decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate
litigation -should be made by the board of directors or the majority of shareholders"' (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 531 (1984))); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (noting that derivative action impinges
on managerial freedoms of directors); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (same).
In Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, No. CIVA.11273, 1992 WL 81228 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20,
1992), the Delaware Chancery Court addressed the issue of whether, in one cause
of action involving multiple plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could avoid choosing between
including a demand and losing their right to assert demand futility by pleading
both a demand refused and demand excused case. Id. at *5. In Boeing, one plaintiff made demand on the board, which was ultimately refused. Id. The other
plaintiff made no demand and claimed demand was excused because the board
was interested in a matter involving illegal activities of Boeing employees. Id. The
plaintiffs argued that even though the board refused one plaintiff's demand, the
claims should nevertheless survive because the other plaintiff had not made demand and had therefore properly pled demand futility. Id.
Recognizing that the principles of Spiegel applied to the case, the Chancery
Court ruled that the plaintiffs acted improperly regarding the requirements of demand. Id. The court explained:
The law, as set forth in Spiegel, should make it clear that the demand
requirement is not a mere procedural formality. Plaintiffs cannot use
either of the devices suggested here to, in essence, cover all the bases.
The Spiegel court held that stockholders must make a choice either to
make demand or attempt to establish demand futility. To accept plaintiffs' argument would be to ignore Spiegel
Id.
126. In implementing Rule 23.1, Delaware courts have consistently maintained that the exhaustion of intracorporate remedies is not a mere procedural
formality, but is a rigorous requirement for establishing the plaintiff's standing to
sue on behalf of the corporation.
127. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773 (noting that Rule
23.1 promotes this alternative dispute resolution in recognition of directors' role
in managing business and affairs of corporation); Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624 ("Rule
23.1 exists at the threshold to prevent abuse and to promote intracorporate dispute resolution."); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12 (noting Rule 23.1 demand requirement insures stockholder attempts intracorporate remedies before resorting to
litigation); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) (discussing
role of Rule 23.1).
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The shareholder desiring to assert a claim on the corporation's
behalf has two mutually exclusive choices. 128 First, the shareholder
can demand that the board cause the corporation to file the claim.
If the demand is refused by the board, the shareholder can still
bring a derivative action by showing that the board's refusal to
bring the suit was improper.1 29 These are known as "demand refused" cases.
On the other hand, the shareholder can choose not to make a
pre-suit demand on the board.1 3 0 In this situation, the shareholder
will have standing to bring the derivative action by establishing that
making a demand would have been futile because the board has
conflicts of interest which would prevent it from making an unbiased decision with respect to the demand. These are known as "demand futile" or "demand excused" cases.
In summary, a shareholder will have standing in a demand refused case if: (a) the shareholder makes a demand on the board;
(b) the board chooses not to sue; and (c) the shareholder's complaint establishes that the board's decision not to sue is not protected by the business judgment rule. In a demand excused case, a
shareholder will have standing if: (a) the shareholder does not
make a demand; and (b) the shareholder's complaint establishes
that the demand is excused because the board has a conflict of interest that prevents it from making an unbiased decision whether to
sue. 131

In determining whether a board improperly refused the de128. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) (en banc) (noting
once demand is made, shareholder loses right to bring demand excused case).
129. Id. at 1216 (noting derivative action available where shareholder can
show board improperly failed to bring suit).
130. Id. (stating derivative suit can be brought when shareholder can prove
demand would have been futile).

131. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991). Levine is a recent case in
which the Delaware Supreme Court has taken a comprehensive look at derivative
actions and the issue of shareholder demand on a board of directors.
In Levine, the court was presented with two derivative actions that were consolidated. Id. at 199-200. In one case, the plaintiff shareholders failed to make de-

mand on the board, in the other case, the plaintiff made a demand which had in
turn been refused by the board. Id. at 199. Both cases revolved around General

Motors' (GM) decision to repurchase its shares held by H. Ross Perot as well as

Perot's shares in Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS), a wholly owned subsidiary of GM. Id. at 198-99. In one claim, the plaintiff did not make demand on

the board, nor did the plaintiff plead particularized facts establishing that demand
should be excused as being futile. Id. at 199. In the other claim, the plaintiff
made written demand on the GM board to rescind the repurchase of Perot's stock.
Id. The board voted unanimously to reject the plaintiff's demand. Id. The plaintiff then initiated discovery, which was followed by the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. Id.
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mand or if the demand would have been futile if made, Delaware
courts consider only the well-pleaded facts in the complaint.1 32 The
court will only consider particularized factual allegations; con1 33
clusory allegations (notice pleadings) will not suffice.
The particularized facts pleaded must create a reasonable
doubt that: (1) the board improperly refused the demand or (2) if
no demand was made, the board was capable of making an unbiased determination with respect to the litigation. The Delaware
Supreme Court has declined to adopt a bright line test for what
constitutes "reasonable doubt," but has observed that the Chancery
Court's determination is "essentially a discretionary ruling on a pre132. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990) (holding that in deciding motion to dismiss for failure to make demand under Rule 23.1, courts are
restricted to complaint); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (concluding "court reviews the factual allegations of the complaint"); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (noting "alleged wrong is substantively reviewed against
the factual background alleged in complaint").
In Levine, the plaintiff relied on the court's earlier holding in Zapata for support that he was entitled to limited discovery. Levine, 591 A.2d at 208. In denying
discovery, the court recognized that Zapata was a demand excused case and that
the court in Aronson stated that "unless a special committee of the board has
moved to dismiss, the issue of demand futility must be determined on the basis of
the shareholder's derivative complaint." Id. at 208-09 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at
813-14). The court stated that discovery is only to be allowed in a Zapata demand
excused context. Id. at 209. The court explained that "the rationale for allowing
discovery in a demand excused-Zapata context has no application in the case of
either demand refused or demand excused, absent the Zapata context." Id.
In addition, the court stated that such presumptions do not apply to a demand refused case. The Levine court concluded its discussion regarding discovery
rights by stating that "[i]f discovery were permitted in demand refused cases, and
not in demand excused cases other than in the Zapata situation, our careful distinctions between demand excused and demand refused would be upset by favoring the latter with limited discovery without first satisfying the pleading
requirements of Rule 23.1." Id. at 210. For further discussion of Zapata, see infra
notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (en banc)
("[In filing a derivative suit, a stockholder] must allege either that the board rejected his pre-suit demand ... or allege with particularity why the stockholder was
justified in not having made the effort to obtain board action."); Rales'v. Blasband,
634 A.2d 927, 931 (Del. 1993) (noting well-pleaded facts are deemed true, but
conclusory allegations are not true); see Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1355
(Del. Ch. 1995) (finding plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts with particularity,
but instead alleged "in a conclusory manner that the other directors 'looked the
other way"').
Rule 23.1 pleading demands are more stringent than those required to survive
a Rule 12(b) (6) motion under the Delaware or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because the court may only consider the well-pleaded, particularized facts in the
complaint. Levine, 591 A.2d at 207; see also Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F.
Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del. 1985) (noting Rule 23.1 represents "a marked departure
from the 'notice' pleading philosophy" governing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985); Levine, 591 A,2d at 210 (stating Rule
23.1 requires plaintiff to plead with particularity and, therefore, is exception to
notice pleading of Federal Rules).
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dominately factual issue"'34,and is subject to an abuse of discretion
standard on appeal. 135 Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that "reasonable doubt" means that "there is a reason to
13 6
doubt" and it is counterpart to the concept of reasonable belief.
Significantly, no discovery is allowed in a typical case. 13 7 Thus,
the shareholder must rely on the facts known or information obtained from the media or public records. 138 In addition, shareholders may also obtain relevant information by requesting to inspect
the books and records of the corporation pursuant to section 220 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law.1 3 9 The lack of discovery,
134. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 n.15 ("Such a test implicates a determination by
the court of chancery which involves 'essentially a discretionary ruling on a predominately factual issue." (quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988)
("Reasonable doubt must be decided by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.")));
see also Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992) (determining
if pleading creates reasonable doubt that factual issue exists); Levine, 591 A.2d at
204-05 (same).
The Delaware Court of Chancery also explained that:
IT]he demand excused test employs a "reasonable doubt" standard and
unavoidably calls upon the trial court to make a decision that, while not
discretionary in the strong sense of that term which implies some area of
unreviewable good faith judgment, is discretionary in the weaker sense of
requiring decision that is highly particular and involves informed
judgment.
Abajian v. Kennedy, No. CIVA.11425, 1992 WL 8794, at *4 (Del. Ch.Jan. 17, 1992)
(footnote omitted).
135. Heineman, 611 A.2d at 952 (noting determination as to whether plaintiff
has effectively pleaded futility "'involves essentially a discretionary ruling on a
predominantly factual issue"' and is subject to review only for abuse of discretion
(quoting Grobow, 539 A.2d at 186)).
136. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216. Additionally, the court stated:
[O]bversely, the concept of reasonable doubt is akin to the concept that
the stockholder has a 'reasonable belief' that the board lacked independence or that the transaction was not protected by the business judgment
rule. The concept of reasonable belief is an objective test and is found in
various corporate contexts.
Id. at 1217 n.17 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1215 n.11 ("Although derivative plaintiffs ... are not entitled to
discovery.., they have many avenues available to obtain information bearing on
the subject of their claims."); Ra/es, 634 A.2d at 935 (noting discovery is not permitted to assist plaintiffs in complying with Rule 23.1); Levine, 591 A.2d at 208-10
(holding plaintiff is not entitled to discovery in demand futile case); Grobow, 539
A.2d at 186 ("[A] Rule 23.1 motion normally precedes rather than follows discovery."); Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 625 (noting plaintiff must plead without the benefit of
discovery).
138. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 ("For example, there is a variety of public
sources from which the details of a corporate act may be discovered, including the
media and governmental agencies .... ); Raes, 634 A.2d at 934-35 n.10 (stating
plaintiff can use public sources such as media reports and federal agency filings).
139. In Grimes, the court added that "[i]n addition, a stockholder who has
met the procedural requirement and has shown a specific proper purpose may use
the summary procedure embodied in [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974 & Supp.
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the reasonable doubt standard and the requirement that only the

particularized facts in the complaint will be considered by the court
to determine standing tip the scales decidedly in favor of the board
when it moves to terminate derivative litigation.

B.

Demand Refused by the Board

As litigation decisions are generally within the board's sole purview, Rule 23.1 normally requires a shareholder to make a demand
on the board that the corporation assert the claim. 14° If the shareholder makes such a demand, courts have held that the board is
conclusively presumed to be disinterested and independent with respect to their ability to make unbiased decisions concerning the litigation.14 1 Consequently, if the board refuses the shareholder's
demand, the court will allow a derivative action to proceed only if
the shareholder adequately pleads that the board's refusal is not
protected by the business judgment rule because the board lacked
good faith or did not exercise due care. 142 By making a demand
1994)] to investigate the possibility of corporate wrongdoing." Grimes, 673 A.2d at
1215 n.11.
140. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1218 ("In no event may
a corporation assume a position of neutrality and take no position in response to
the demand.") (citation omitted); Rates, 634 A.2d at 935 (stating once stockholder
files demand letter, directors must, in good faith, inform themselves of facts relating to litigation and alternatives available before responding to demand); Yaw v.
Talley, No. CIVA.12882, 1994 WL 89019, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1994) (mem.)
(discussing necessity of demand upon board); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611
A.2d 950, 950-52 (Del. 1992) (noting in usual case shareholder must make demand upon board to seek redress); Seibert v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No.
CIV.A.6639, 1984 WL 21874 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (noting three elements are
generally required to make "demand": (i) the identity of the alleged wrongdoers,
(ii) the wrongdoing they allegedly perpetrated and the resultant injury to the corporation, and (iii) the legal action the shareholder wants the board to take on the
corporation's behalf); Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1112-13
(D. Del. 1985) (discussing shareholder duties in making demand).
141. Ra/es, 634 A.2d at 935 n.12 (noting shareholder making demand concedes directors are independent and disinterested); Levine, 591 A.2d at 212-13 (reaffirming director independence and lack of self-interest is conceded in demand
made case); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774-75 (Del. 1990) (holding that if
shareholder makes demand, he or she waives ability to assert demand is futile and
subjects board action to review under business judgment rule).
142. Levine, 591 A.2d at 212 ("'When a board refuses a demand, the only issues to be examined are the good faith and reasonableness of its investigation."'
(quoting Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 777)). E.g., Spiege 571 A.2d 774-76 (noting that
courts apply business judgment rule to board's decision to refuse demand); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (noting courts apply business judgment
rule in reviewing board's refusal to act on shareholder's demand); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) ("[W]hen stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board's decision as improper, the board's decision falls under the 'business judgment' rule and will be
respected if the requirements of the rule are met.").
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and thereby conceding loyalty, the shareholder is unable to rely
upon any possible breach of the duty of loyalty for purposes of establishing the shareholder's standing to sue derivatively. Thus, in
order to be able to sue derivatively in demand refused cases, the
shareholder must plead particularized facts creating a reasonable
doubt that the board's decision to refuse the demand was made
43
with due care or in good faith.
C.

Demand Excused Cases Generally

An important exception to the demand requirement is that demand will be excused when it would be futile. 144 Essentially, in demand excused cases, the courts review whether the board can make
an unbiased business judgment with respect to the litigation. 14 5 Demand is excused only if the board is so completely under the influence of an officer or director that the board's discretion is
"sterilized.' 46
In order to show that demand is futile, a shareholder must
plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that, even if
143. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1220 (noting shareholder who makes pre-suit demand is required to "plead with particularity why the Board's refusal to act on the
derivative claims was wrongful" (citing Levine, 591 A.2d at 211)); Levine, 591 A.2d
at 210 ("The reasons underlying the adoption in Aronson of the 'reasonable doubt'
test to a claim of demand futility have equal application to standing of a derivative
plaintiff to maintain a claim of wrongful refusal of demand.").
144. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (stating basis for excusal would be: "(1) a majority of the board has a material financial or familial interest; (2) a majority of the
board is incapable of acting independently for some other reason such as domination or control; or (3) the underlying transaction is not the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment" (footnotes omitted)); Heineman, 611 A.2d at 952
(explaining circumstances in which demand is futile); Levine, 591 A.2d at 205-08
(stating when majority of board has financial interest, lacks due care or independence, demand would be futile); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (noting where board is
under influences which sterilize decision, demand is futile); Zapata, 430 A.2d at
784 (stating exception to demand requirement is futility which exists when board
members are influenced and cannot properly conduct litigation).
145. See Heineman, 611 A.2d at 952 (holding where demand is futile, courts
excuse demand requirement). In Heineman, the shareholder brought suit alleging
corporate waste and breach of fiduciary duty, originating out of four transactions,
each approved by the board. Id. at 951. The court explained that "though [the
plaintiff] is not required to plead a prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty in
order to avoid the demand requirement, once [the plaintiff] does make such allegations he has carried his burden and demand is excused." Id. at 953.
146. McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191 (Del. Ch. 1931). In McKee, the court stated:
[A] stockholder may sue in equity in his derivative right to assert a cause
of action in behalf of the corporation, without prior demand upon the
director to sue, when it is apparent that a demand would be futile, that
the officers are under an influence that sterilizes discretion and could not
be proper persons to conduct the litigation.
Id. at 193.
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demand had been made, the board's decision to refuse the demand
would be protected by the business judgment rule. In other words,
the question is whether the board could have made an unbiased
decision regarding a demand, if one had been made. Significantly,
by not making the demand, the shareholder has not conceded that
the board is disinterested and independent. Thus, in order to have
standing in a demand excused case, the shareholder must plead
particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that: (1) a
majority of the board is disinterested and independent or (2) the
challenged transaction was the subject of a proper business judgment. 147 Where the plaintiff adequately pleads either alternative of
this two prong test, demand is excused because making a demand
would have been futile.
When conducting the first inquiry, the court determines
whether there is a reasonable doubt that a majority of the directors
are interested or not independent. If the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to create reasonable doubt that the transaction in question
involves a majority of board members who are either interested or
lack independence, the business judgment rule would not protect
147. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 ("One ground for alleging with particularity
that demand would be futile is that a 'reasonable doubt' exists that the board is
capable of making an independent decision to assert the claim if demand were
made." (footnote omitted)); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) (noting reasonable doubt standard); Heineman, 611 A.2d at 952 (same); Levine, 591
A.2d at 205-07. In Levine, the court stated:
[I]n a claim of demand futility, there are two alternative hurdles, either
of which a derivative shareholder complainant must overcome to successfully withstand a Rule 23.1 motion. . . [However], [w]hen the challenged transaction is approved by a board, the majority of whom are
outside, nonmanagement directors, "a heavy burden falls on [plaintiffs]
to avoid presuit demand."
Id. (quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988)); Spiegel v. Buntrock,
571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990) (discussing reasonable doubt standard); Grobow,
539 A.2d at 186 (same); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (holding if
Chancery Court is satisfied plaintiff has alleged facts which, taken as true, establish
reasonable doubt as to either element, then its inquiry ends as the plaintiff has
established demand futility); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ("[The trial court] must
make two inquiries, one into the independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and
the board's approval thereof."). In Abajian, the court noted that the legal test
regarding an allegation of demand futility asks:
Whether accepting the specific facts pleaded as true, they create a reasonable doubt that the board's judgment attacked as constituting a wrong
will not qualify for business judgment protection. That judgment may
ultimately fail to qualify for business judgment deference because it is
found to be the product of a board that is not disinterested and independent or because, even if the board appears disinterested, its process
was such as to disqualify its judgment for that deference.
Abajian v. Kennedy, No. CIVA.8794, 1992 WL 8794, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 1992)
(mem.) (footnote omitted).
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the board's decision to refuse a demand if one had been made and
148
demand futility is established.
The tests for determining whether a director is interested or
lacks independence are the same as the tests for other business
judgment rule cases. 149 A director is interested in a transaction if
the director seeks to entrench his or her position or stands on both
sides of the transaction and derives a material, personal or financial
benefit not shared by the corporation or the stockholders. 150 Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to expand interestedness to include a material familial interest. 151 A director lacks
independence if the director's decisions are based on considerations or influences other than the merits of the decision.1 52 For
example, a director is not independent if the director is beholden
to one of the principals in the transaction in a way that affects the
15 3
director's independent judgment.
148. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219 n.25 (noting where board did not act independently, business judgment rule does not attach) (citing Kahn iv.Lynch Communications Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994)); Grobow, 539 A.2d at 188 (holding
plaintiffs must "plead particularized facts demonstrating either a financial interest
or entrenchment" on part of directors); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (stating where
interested board action exists, business judgment rule does not attach and futility
is established).
149. For a further discussion of interestedness or lack of independence, see
supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
150. Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624 ("Directorial interest exists whenever divided
loyalties are present, or a director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a
personal financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not equally
shared by the stockholders."); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (noting plaintiff must show
board to be dominated by officer or director so discretion is "sterilized"). The
Rales court summarized the law of Aronson and its progeny as follows:
Directorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are present, or a director has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit
from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the stockholders. The question of independence flows from an analysis of the factual allegations pertaining to the influences upon the directors'
performance of their duties generally, and more specifically in respect to
the challenged transaction.
Rales, 634 A.2d at 933 (citing Pogostin,480 A.2d at 624); see also Grobow, 539 A.2d at
188 (stating interestedness may be shown through entrenchment).
151. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (noting basis for excusal would be majority of
board has material financial or familial interest) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at
815); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.23(a) (2), at 25 (1994) (defining interested
director as one who "has a business, financial, or familial relationship with a party
to the transaction").
152. For a discussion of director independence, see supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
153. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (stating basis for excusal is when majority of
board is incapable of acting independently). In Aronson, the court held that in
order to overcome the presumption of independence, the plaintiff cannot merely
allege that a director was chosen by or "elected at the behest of those controlling
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Naming a director as a defendant and asserting claims against
that director is not enough to make the director interested or not
independent. 154 Similarly, the director's approval of the underlying challenged transaction, absent a breach of a fiduciary duty of
the director in making that decision, is insufficient to establish that
the director is interested or lacks independence.1 55 Furthermore,
owning stock, 156 even a majority of stock, or earning a fee for being
a director does not make a director interested. Similarly, being
nominated or elected by a controlling shareholder does not establish that a director lacks independence.1 5 7 In order to overcome
the business judgment rule presumption of independence based on
influence of a controlling person over a director, the plaintiff must
15 8
allege that the director is "beholden to the controlling person."
Even if the shareholder does not create a reasonable doubt
that a majority of the board is disinterested or independent, the
the outcome of a corporate election. . . . It is the care, attention and sense of
individual responsibility to the performance of one's duties, not the method of
election, that generally touches on independence." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. According to the court in Aronson, "[i] ndependence means that a director's decision
is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences." Id. Where a plaintiff claims demand futility,
he or she must allege particularized facts "manifesting 'a direction of corporate
conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation
(or persons) doing the controlling."' Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284
A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971)). When a plaintiff shareholder claims that the
board is not independent, the plaintiff must show that the board is either dominated by a director or officer who supports the involved transaction or that the
board is so under that director's or officer's influence that the board's discretion
has been "sterilized." Id. at 814.
154. Id. at 815. In Aronson, the court noted:
[T]he mere threat of personal liability for approving a questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the independence or disinterestedness of directors, although in rare cases a
transaction may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot
meet the test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists.
Id.; see also Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1993) (noting director faced substantial likelihood of personal liability, but defendant's actions were
not so egregious as to merit finding substantial likelihood of liability existed).
155. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817.
156. Id. at 816; Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988) (holding director ownership of 0.8 percent of stock was insufficient to establish director
interest).
157. Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 955 (Del. 1992) ("Allegation[s] that directors are dominated and controlled, standing alone, does not
meet the demand futility standard." (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816)).
158. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson, 473
A.2d at 814); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991); Kaplan v. Centex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. 1974); Lewis v. Aronson, No. CIVA.6919 (Del. Ch.
May 1, 1985).
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court then moves to the second inquiry. Here, the court determines whether, based on the allegations of the complaint alone,
the plaintiff has established a reasonable doubt that the challenged
1 59
decision would be protected by the business judgment rule.
Thus, the challenging shareholder must allege facts which are sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the directors breached their
duty of care, good faith or duty of loyalty with respect to the underlying board decision being challenged by the shareholder. The
analysis is very similar to any attack on a business judgment. In this
situation, however, the challenging shareholder can only rely upon
particularized facts in the pleadings and must only create a reasonable doubt concerning whether the business judgment rule would
be applicable.
D.

Demand Excused When Board Not Involved in
Challenged Transaction

In Rales v. Blasband,160 the Delaware Supreme Court first recognized the possibility that the two-step analysis should not apply in a
demand excused case when the board considering the demand did
not make the business decision being challenged in the derivative
suit.1 6 ' In Rales, the court described three scenarios where the twotiered analysis would be inappropriate: (1) where the board of a
corporation made a business decision, but a majority of the directors who made that decision have since been replaced; (2) where
the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of the
board; and (3) where, as in Rales, the decision being challenged was
made by the board of a different corporation.1 62 In each of these
situations, the board facing the shareholder's demand did not
make the particular decision at issue in the derivative suit.
Rales involved a double derivative suit in which a shareholder
of the parent corporation attempted to assert a cause of action oil
behalf of the subsidiary corporation without making pre-suit demand on the parent's board.1 63 The parent's board did not make
159. Levine, 591 A.2d at 206 (reinforcing requirement that plaintiff plead particularized facts to create reasonable doubt); Grobow, 539 A.2d at 187 (stating plaintiffs must plead particularized facts to rebut presumption of business judgment
rule); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (same).
160. 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
161. Id. at 933.
162. Id. at 934.
163. Id. at 930-31. The question before the court in Rates was whether the
shareholder of the parent corporation adequately demonstrated demand futility in
order to assert a cause of action on behalf of the subsidiary. Id. at 930. The actions
spawning this litigation occurred after Easco Hand Tools, Inc. ("Easco") entered
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the decisions that were the subject of the derivative action; rather,
the decisions were made by the subsidiary's directors. Thus, the
court declined to apply the two-tiered test for standing and held
that in situations where the board did not make a business decision
in the underlying transaction, a derivative suit was appropriate only
if the board reviewing the demand would be incapable of making a
disinterested and independent determination of whether to pursue
the litigation. 164 By adopting this one-step analysis, the court recognized that "[w]here there is no conscious decision by directors to
act or refrain from acting, the business judgment rule [the second
165
part of the two-step inquiry] has no application."
into a merger agreement with the Danaher Corporation ("Danaher") to become a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Danaher.. Id. The question of demand futility arose
because the Rales brothers, named defendants, were directors of Easco at the time
of the merger. Id. In addition, the brothers owned 52% of Easco's common stock
and 44% of Danaher stock. Id. Furthermore, the brothers were, at all times, directors, officers and shareholders of Danaher and Easco. Id.
164. Id. at 933. The court determined that because the directors of Danaher
had not made a decision regarding the substance of the challenged transaction,
the Aronson test could not be applied in full. Id. "'The ... business judgment
inquiry of Aronson focuses on the substantive nature of the challenged transaction
and the board's approval thereof."' Id. (quoting Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619,
624 (Del. 1984)).
In creating a different test for situations in which the board to whom demand
would be made was not involved in the challenged decision, the court explained:
"'What, in the end, is relevant [in demand excused situations] is not whether the
board that approved the challenged transaction was or was not interested in that
transaction but whether the present board is not disabled from exercising its right
and duty to control corporate litigation."' Id. at 934 n.8 (quoting Harris v. Carter,
582 A.2d 222, 230 (Del. Ch. 1990)). In addition, the court noted that in deciding
whether a board of directors can consider a demand under the Rales standard, the
reviewing court should investigate whether the board followed a two-step process
that involves: (1) the directors determining the best way to adequately inform
themselves of the facts relating to the alleged wrongful transaction, including conducting an investigation reasonably and in good faith, and (2) the board weighing
its alternatives, including making a determination as to the advisability of commencing legal action. Id.'at 935.
165. Id. at 933 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984)). The
court noted, however, that because Rales involved a double derivative suit, the
plaintiff was required to satisfy the Aronson two-tiered analysis with respect to the
subsidiary's board in order to establish the futility of demanding suit on that
board. Id. at 934. The court required the plaintiff to satisfy the Aronson inquiry
because the subsidiary board entered into the alleged wrongful transactions. Id.
Thus, under Aronson, the Rales plaintiffs were required to show that the subsidiary's
board was interested and not independent and thus, would not have been able to
make an objective, neutral determination with respect to whether demand should
be refused. Id.
In determining that the Aronson two-tiered analysis applied to the subsidiary
board's decision to enter into the financial arrangements, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that a standard test should apply in order to deter strike
suits. Id. The court rejected the defendant's recommendation that, in this and
other demand excused cases, the court adopt either a universal demand requirement or a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a reasonable probability of
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Independent Litigation Committees

In response to either a shareholder demand or a derivative lawsuit commenced without demand, the board may want to evaluate
whether the claim the shareholder desires to pursue is in the best
interests of the corporation. A board, perceiving their lack of independence in reviewing a shareholder's claim or desiring to ensure
an unbiased evaluation, may form a special committee of disinterested and independent directors to decide whether the litigation is
in the best interests of the corporation. Like all board decisions,
the special committee's decision is subject to judicial review. To
date, the Delaware Supreme Court has only decided cases involving
special committee decisions made after the shareholder's derivative
suit has been filed; the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet reviewed a special committee's pre-suit analysis of a shareholder
demand.
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,166 the Delaware Supreme Court
first discussed the formation and role of a board's independent litigation committee and formulated a standard of review for the decisuccess. Id. The court found that neither approach would decrease the possibility
of strike suits in greater numbers than adherence to the Aronson precedent. Id. at
934-35.
In Seminaris v. Landa,662 A.2d 1350 (Del. Ch. 1995), the shareholder claimed
that various board members conspired with the former Chairman of the Board to
disseminate misleading and inaccurate information about the corporation's financial condition and participated in the misrepresentation of signing misleading
statements. In the alternative, the plaintiff also alleged that the board failed to
take steps to stop the Chairman from making the misrepresentations concerning
the corporation's financial conditions. Id. at 1352, 1354. The shareholder initiated suit because the former Chairman of the Board made a public statement that
the corporation would report a $250,000 profit for the reporting period. Id. at
1352. The chairman's figure, however, significantly overstated the profit amount.
Id. at 1354-55. In Seminaris, the Delaware Chancery Court applied the Raes standard because the corporation's board did not make any business judgment with
respect to the challenged transaction. Id. at 1354. The threshold question in
Seminaris was whether to apply the Raes one-step test or the traditional two-tiered
analysis. The Vice Chancellor applied Raes, finding that the shareholder failed to
allege that the board made a conscious decision to take (or not to take) any specific action with respect to the alleged improper activity. Id. Accordingly, the
court decided that the Rales one-step test, rather than the Aronson two-step test
applied to the situation because the "plaintiff [did] not challenge any specific
board action that approved or ratified ... alleged wrongdoings." Id. Applying the
Rales standard, the court found that the plaintiff did not plead particularized facts
creating a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint was filed, a majority
of the board of directors was independent or disinterested. Id. According to the
court, the plaintiff had only established the likelihood that the former Chairman
of the Board would be personally liable for his misrepresentations, but he had
resigned from the board before the plaintiff had brought the derivative action. Id.
Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff's allegations of a conspiracy among
directors lacked support. Id.
166. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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sions of such special committees. In Zapata, a shareholder
commenced a derivative action without first making a demand on
67
the board, claiming that such demand would have been futile.'
Four years after the shareholder filed suit, the board created an
"Independent Investigation Committee" composed of two newly-appointed directors to investigate whether the corporation should
move to dismiss the plaintiff's claims. 168 After investigation, the
committee determined that a motion should be filed to dismiss the
shareholder's claims.' 69
In its review of the motion to dismiss, the court recognized that
Delaware General Corporation Law allows a board to delegate decision-making authority, including derivative power to file a motion
to dismiss the litigation to a committee.1 70 The court held that the
board may delegate its decision-making authority in this area to a
committee composed of disinterested directors even though a ma71
jority of the whole board is tainted by disqualifying self-interests.
If such a committee is appointed and, after investigation, determines that the litigation is not in the corporation's best interest, the
committee may cause the corporation to file a motion to dismiss.
The motion should include a written record of the committee's in72
vestigation, findings and recommendations.'
In deciding whether to grant a board's motion to dismiss, the
courts focus on the propriety of the committee's decision. Since
the board's committee has made a business decision, it would normally be entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule.
In this context, however, the courts are sensitive to the fact that
presumably'the shareholder had standing to bring the derivative
167. Id. at 780. The plaintiff stated that demand would have been futile because all of the directors named as defendants in the action had allegedly played a
role in the challenged acts. Id.
168. Id. at 781. The Committee's determination was considered to be "final,
•.. not.., subject to review by the Board of Directors and.., in all respects...
binding upon the Corporation." Id. When the Independent Committee was
formed, four of the defendant directors were no longer on the board. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 782. According to the court, "the board entity remains empowered
under § 141(a) to make decisions regarding corporate litigation. The problem is
one of membership disqualification, not the absence of power in the board." Id. at
786.
171. Id. Relying upon § 141(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
the court found that the law was designed to allow disinterested directors to act on
behalf of the board, regardless of the interest of the majority of the board. Id. The
court noted "[w]e do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is per
se a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to an independent committee
composed of disinterested board members." Id.
172. Id. at 788.
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claim initially and that the true independence of the board is somewhat suspect. On the other hand, the courts are also aware of the
fact that the derivative action may not always be in the best interest
of the corporation and independent board members may be the
best parties to weigh the costs and benefits of the litigation to the
corporation. In order to balance these competing interests, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata was unwilling to give the board
committee the benefit of the business judgment rule but was also
unwilling to permit the shareholder to go forward with derivative
litigation inimical to the corporation's best interest. In striking the
balance, the court designed a two-step test to determine the propriety of an independent committee's decision to terminate the derivative suit in the corporation's best interest.
First, the court must "inquire into the independence and good
173
faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions."
The burden is on the board to establish the committee's independence, good faith and reasonable investigation. 174 Unlike other demand excused or demand refused cases, the shareholder is entitled
to discovery limited to these issues. 175 The court will deny the motion if it finds any genuine issue of material fact concerning the
committee's independence, reasonable bases for its conclusions,
good faith or any other deficiencies in the process followed by the
committee. 176
Second, the court may, in its discretion, apply its own business
judgment in order to determine whether the motion to dismiss
should be granted. 177 The Zapata court stated that this step "provides... the essential key in striking the balance between legitimate
corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a
corporation's best interests as expressed by an independent investigating committee.' 78 This second step may result in the denial of
173. Id. Essentially, the court treats the corporation's motion to dismiss like a
motion for summary judgment, determining whether there is a genuine issue as to
a material fact. Id. The two-tiered analysis permits the court to make a determination as to whether such a genuine issue exists regarding the independent committee's ability to make a reasonable, good faith decision concerning the
recommendation to terminate the litigation. Id. at 789.
174. Id. at 788.
175. Id.; see also Szeto v. Schiffer, No. CIVA.12934, 1993 WL 513229, at *3
(Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1993) (mem.) (noting limited discovery is available to investigate board independence and good faith).
176. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
177. Id. at 789.
178. Id.; see Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1191 (Del. 1995) (holding second
step is discretionary); WiLLLAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
1063 (7th ed. 1995) (noting that given importance that Aronson court ascribed to
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a motion to dismiss even when the committee established the decision was the product of a legitimate business judgment. 179 According to the court, " [t] he second step is intended to thwart instances
where corporate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result
does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions
would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance 8de0
serving of further consideration in the corporation's interest."
Since Zapata, the Delaware courts have addressed special committees in a variety of different contexts. In Abbey v. Computer &
Communications Technology Corp.,181 a shareholder made demand on
the board. The board did not immediately respond to the demand
primarily because the corporation's general counsel was on vacation, a fact known by the shareholder.1 2 Impatient with the
board's delay in responding to the demand, the shareholder
brought a derivative action before receiving a response from the
board. 83 Shortly after the shareholder instituted the derivative
second step (i.e. "essential in striking the balance") it seems anomalous that second step is discretionary).
179. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
180. Id. In Zapata the court discussed its two-tiered test and presumed demand futility. According to the court, a reviewing court must "consider and weigh
how compelling the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit." Id.
Although the injection of the court's "own business judgment" seems contrary
to the basic policies behind the business judgment rule, it has been used in other
analogous situations where it was necessary to provide an additional level of protection to stockholders. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(e) (requiring court approval of settlement or dismissal of class action); Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe HarborfromJudicial
Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-An Analytical Frameworkfor Litigation Strategy
and Counseling Directors, 37 Bus. LAw. 1247 (1982) (noting that Chancery Court
must use its judgment in deciding whether to approve settlements in derivative
actions). The reviewing court's independent business judgment review of a special
litigation committee's report to dismiss a derivative action seems justified on the
basis that the ability of a special committee to be truly independent is often questionable. See, e.g., Joy v. 'North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting federal
court's concern over structural bias arising because independent committee is typically nominated and appointed by defendant directors), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); see a/soJohn C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261,
273-77 (1981) (stating special litigation committee "too easily tamed and held hostage, either by explicit agreement or ... by the expectations of the rest of the
board").
181. 457 A.2d 368 (Del. Ch. 1983).
182. Id. at 370.
183. Id. After making demand on the board, the plaintiff received a letter
from the board stating that it would be unable to review the demand until corporate general counsel returned from vacation. Id. Counsel returned after the ten
day deadline given to the board by the plaintiff in her demand letter. Id. Even
though the plaintiff knew that consideration of demand would be delayed, she
filed suit five days before corporate counsel was due to return from vacation. Id.
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suit, the board added a new independent director to the board and
formed a one-member independent committee (comprised of the
new director) to investigate the plaintiff's claim. 184 The committee
immediately filed a motion to dismiss the derivative claim based on
the shareholder's failure to comply with the presuit demand requirement of Rule 23.1.185
In Abbey, the court held that the board, by forming a special
committee with complete decision-making authority after the derivative suit had been filed, had conceded that the board was not independent. Therefore, the court concluded that demand was
excused on that basis. 186 The court indicated, however, that the
board would not have conceded futility had it moved to dismiss the
action while simultaneously appointing a special committee to investigate the shareholder's claims. 187 The court reasoned that in
that situation the board would have reserved its final decision-making power and the court's review of the decision to terminate the
litigation under the Zapata standard would then be inappropriate. 188 Nevertheless, in Abbey, the court permitted the independent
committee to complete its investigation and then disclose its find184. Id. at 370-71. The board adopted a resolution adding a new, disinterested director to the board, naming him as the sole member of the independent
litigation committee which was charged with conducting a full investigation into
the demand, making the committee's findings and determinations final and not
subject to board review. Id. at 371. The one-member independent committee retained independent counsel and began its investigation. Id. Several days later, the
corporation and the individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit for
failure to comply with Rule 23.1, and in the alternative, to stay the proceedings
until the committee released its report. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 373. In Abbey, the court stated that:
[B]y divesting itself of any power to make a decision on the pending suit,
and by adding a new and independent director and by designating him as
a Special Litigation Committee of one with the final and absolute authority to make the decision on behalf of the corporation, the incumbent
board of directors, in effect, conceded that the circumstances alleged in
the complaint justified the initiation of the suit by the plaintiff [without
pre-suit demand].
Id.
187. Id. at 374.
188. Id. The court concluded that:
In such a case, the board would not be empowering the committee to
invoke the new Zapata procedure and to move for a dismissal of the suit
in its own right on behalf of the corporation. It would not be surrendering its § 141(a) authority to an independent committee which, [under
Zapata], is now permitted only in a situation where the board, or a majority thereof, is disqualified under the circumstances alleged in the
complaint.
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ings subject to the two-part Zapata test.1 8 9 The court followed this
procedure because a party to the lawsuit cannot conduct discovery
while an independent committee investigates a demand claim.1 9 0
In Seminaris v. Landa,19 ' the shareholder argued that demand
was excused because the board, by appointing a special litigation
committee before the board moved to dismiss the shareholder's derivative suit for failure to make a demand, had conceded that it was
not independent.1 92 The court rejected the shareholder's assertion
for two reasons. First, the shareholder relied upon Levine v.
Smith, 193 which was a demand refused case, not a demand excused
case. 194 Second, the court noted that Levine itself had clearly stated
that "a disinterested board of directors does not waive its right to
control derivative litigation merely by delegating that control to a
1 95
special committee."
The court in Seminaris also looked to Rales where the ViceChancellor had explained that in order to find that the board conceded demand futility, the shareholder must allege particularized
facts that support a factual determination that the board intended
to concede demand. 196 In Seminaris, the court held that the shareholder failed to make the required showing because he did not allege any facts demonstrating that the board considered itself
incapable of making an impartial decision other than the fact that
189. Id.
190. Id. at 375. According to the court, "[i]f Zapata is to be meaningful, then
it would seem that such an independent committee, once appointed, should be
afforded a reasonable time to carry out its function. It would likewise seem reasonable to hold normal discovery and other matters in abeyance during this interval."
Id.
191. 662 A.2d 1350 (Del. Ch. 1995).
192. In Seminaris, the plaintiff argued that under Levine, the board conceded
that demand was futile by appointing a special committee comprised solely of
outside directors before the board moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for
failure to make a demand. Id. The plaintiff contended that Levine suggests that
appointing a special committee in response to derivative litigation establishes a
concession by the board that demand would have been futile. Id. at 1353.
In response, the defendant directors claimed that under Spiegel, the board's
delegation of litigation authority to a special committee did not concede demand
futility. Id. at 1352. The shareholder distinguished Spiegel because the Spiegel
board made a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 23.1 before appointing a special committee. Id. In the present situation, however, the defendants appointed a special committee to review the merits of the lawsuit before
making a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 23.1 Id.
193. 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
194. Seminaris, 662 A.2d at 1353.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990)).
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it had appointed a special litigation committee.1 97 Accordingly, the
court found that the board had not conceded that it was interested
and the shareholder bore the burden of showing that demand was
excused under the Rales one-step test.1 9 8
Seminaris and Abbey seem to be inconsistent. The court in Abbey
was willing to presume that the board conceded interestedness simply by appointing an independent committee. Seminaris, on the
other hand, required that the shareholder demonstrate that the
board was, in fact, interested. We think Seminaris is consistent with
the Supreme Court's approach in Levine and Spiegel v. Buntrock.a99
We believe, however, that even under the court's approach in
Seminaris, a court would find the board in Abbey interested under
the facts of that case.20 0 In other words, we think that the Supreme
Court would not view the appointment of an independent committee alone as a concession by the board that it was interested.
VII.

UNDERSTANDING

THE SHIFTING BURDENS DEPENDING UPON

PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE CASE

In challenges to directors' business decisions, a shareholder
has the burden of moving forward with evidence sufficient to state a
prima facie case and bears the initial burden of proof to provide
the court with the quantum of evidence necessary, at that stage of
the proceeding, to defeat the presumptions of the business judgment rule. The shareholder must meet its burden of proof and
rebut the business judgment rule at each stage of the case. If the
shareholder rebuts the business judgment rule at each stage, the
board will bear the burden of proof of demonstrating the entire
fairness of the director's business decisions.
In shareholder litigation, the procedural posture of the case
determines the quantum of evidence necessary and where the burden of proof lies. While the burden of moving forward with the
case and establishing a prima facie case will always rest with the
197. Id. The court distinguished Seminaris on its facts from Abbey v. Computer
& Communications Technology, 457 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. Ch. 1973). In Abbey, the
board responded to a derivative lawsuit by adding a new independent director and
appointing him to a one-member special litigation committee. Id. In Seminaris,
however, the board of directors appointed current members of its own board to
the newly-created special litigation committee. Seminaris, 662 A.2d at 1353. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing an interest for some board
members, but not for the members of the special litigation committee. Id.
198. Id.
199. 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990).
200. For a further discussion of the facts and the court's holding in Abbey, see
supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff, the procedural posture of the case can shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. Accordingly, parties must structure their
pleadings, discovery, proof and argument to conform to the Delaware courts' procedural rubric. In the following sections, we discuss various common pretrial proceedings and the effect of the
procedural posture on the types of pleading or proof permitted,
the amount of proof required and which party bears the burden of
proof on the issues that typically arise in shareholder challenges to
directors' decisions.
A.

Temporary Restraining Order

A temporary restraining order prevents irreparable harm
(generally, but not always, by maintaining the status quo) until such
time as the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction or the injunction is otherwise dissolved.2 0 1 There
are two types of temporary restraining orders. A prohibitive injunction prevents the board from taking action that would result in irreparable harm, while a mandatory injunction requires the board
to take action to prevent irreparable harm to the corporation or its
stockholders.20 2 During the pendency of a temporary restraining
order, the parties typically conduct necessary discovery and the defendant (corporation or board) responds to the allegations of the
2 03
challenging party before the preliminary injunction hearing.
In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, the moving
party must file a verified complaint in the Court of Chancery and a
petition (motion) for a temporary restraining order that requests
immediate relief.2 0 4 Ordinarily, the movant will also provide affida201. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 430, 437 (Del. Ch. 1971)
(noting relief is normally granted in order to preserve status quo), rev'd, 285 A.2d
437 (Del. 1971); Marshall v. Holiday Inn, Inc., 174 A.2d 27, 28 (Del. 1961); see also
Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Gould, No. CI.A.14359, 1995 WL 419980, at *3 (Del.
Ch: July 12, 1995) (mem.) (explaining temporary restraining order is unique remedy because it is granted only in emergency situations and only for short time
periods).
202. Cottle v. Carr, No. CIVA..9612, 1988 WL 10415, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9,
1988) (noting remedy of temporary restraining order is designed to prevent imminent, irreparable injury).
203. See UIS, Inc. v. Walbro Corp., No. CIVA.9323, 1987 WL 18108, at *1
(Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1987) (noting defendants responded to complaint while temporary restraining order motion was pending).
204. DEL. CH. CT. R. 65(b). The rule reads in pertinent part:
(b) Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to
the adverse party or the adverse party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the
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vits in support of his request for a temporary injunction.205 The
petition for a temporary restraining order is forwarded immediately
to the Register in Chancery who schedules a conference or hearing
with as much notice as possible to all parties. A temporary restraining order may be granted without notice if the movant certifies that he has made good faith, unsuccessful efforts to give notice
and provides persuasive reasons why the movant would be irreparably harmed by the delay which would result from giving notice. 20 6
The Chancery Court, in ruling upon a petition for a temporary
restraining order, must accept the allegations in the movant's complaint, petition and supporting affidavits as true. 20 7 A temporary
restraining order entered without notice must not exceed ten days,
unless the court extends this period for good cause shown as of
record. 20 8 Ordinarily, a movant for a temporary restraining order
will also seek leave to take expedited discovery immediately to pre20 9
pare for the preliminary injunction hearing.
applicant before the adverse party or the adverse party's attorney can be
heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the
Court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the
notice and the reasons supporting the attorney's claim that notice should
not be required. Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed
forthwith in the office of the Register in Chancery and entered of record;
shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order
was granted without notice; and shall expire by its terms within such time
after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the Court fixes, unless within the
time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like
period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents
that it may be extended for a longer period ....
In case a. temporary
restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary
injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and
takes precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained
the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the application for a
preliminary injunction and, if the party who obtained the temporary restraining order does not do so, the Court shall dissolve the ... order. On
2 days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order
without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the Court may
prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the Court shall proceed to hear and determine
such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Cottle v. Carr, No. CIVA.9612, 1988 WL 10415, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9,
1988) (stating court must treat alleged facts as true); UIS, 1987 WL 18108, at *1.
208. DEL. CH. CT. R. 65(b). For the text of Rule 65(b), see supra note 204.
209. See GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, 415 A.2d 473, 477 (Del. 1980) (noting that "[t] he order of the Vice Chancellor temporarily restraining GM Sub from
proceeding with the tender offer also permitted discovery on an expedited basis").
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To obtain a temporary restraining order, the movant bears the
burden of proving that: (1) imminent, irreparable injury will occur
prior to a full hearing if the order is not issued; (2) the merits of
the complaint "appear to have sufficient weight and plausibility to
justify a short interference" with the defendant's rights; and (3) in
balancing the equities, the risks of irreparable injury to the movant
if the order is not granted are greater than the injury suffered by
the defendant if the order is granted. 2 10 First, in determining
whether the movant has met its burden of proof with respect to the
presence of irreparable harm, the movant must show that there is
no adequate remedy at law.21 1 The injury must also be shown to be

immediate or imminent, and actual, not hypothetical.2 1 2 If the injury which would result is substantial enough, however, the court
213
may not require a showing of immediate or imminent harm.
Second, the movant must usually show that a colorable claim exists. 214 A colorable claim exists if the movant demonstrates that the
claim has "sufficient weight" and "plausibility" to justify the interfer21 5
ence with the defendant's rights for a short period of time.
Third, the movant must demonstrate that the equities warrant temporary restraints.2 1 6 In balancing the equities, the court determines
whether the risks of injury to the movant, if the order is not
210. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Gould, No. CIVA.14359, 1995 WL 419980, at
*3 (Del. Ch. July 12, 1995) (stating temporary restraining order granted where
imminent irreparable injury may occur, where there is sufficient weight to justify
interference and where order is less of risk than irreparable injury); see also Raptor
Sys. Inc. v. Pensak, No. CIVA.13614, 1994 WL 512526, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12,
1994) (noting plaintiff seeking status quo order under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 225 must establish: (1) order will avoid imminent irreparable harm; (2) there is
reasonable likelihood of success on merits; and (3) harm to plaintiff outweighs
harm to defendant).
211. Carson Pirie, 1995 WL 419980, at *3 (noting plaintiff must show "imminent injury that, if it occurs cannot be effectively remedied later, after trial of the
issues, by the award of money damages or the shaping of equitable relief").
212. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's claim of irreparable injury because effect of allegations of improper actions on plaintiff was too speculative).
213. See Panamanian Sec., Inc. v. Punta Alegre Sugar Corp., 146 A.2d 808, 810
(Del. Ch. 1958) (concluding defendant's motion for temporary restraining order
was deficient because there was no showing of urgent need and stating, "I do not
believe that the restraining order only issues when the threat is imminent").
214. Cottle v. Carr, No. CIVA.9612, 1988 WL 10415, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9,
1988).
215. Id.; cf Carson Pirie, 1995 WL 419980, at *3-4 (finding plaintiff did not
establish "colorable" claim when effect of alleged wrongful conduct was "highly
speculative"); see also Cottle, 1988 WL 10415, at *2 (comparing standard of proof in
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions); UIS Inc. v. Walbro
Corp., No. CIVA.9323, 1987 WL 18108, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1987) (same). For
a further discussion of the standard of review at the preliminary injunction stage,
see infra notes 230-244 and accompanying text.
216. Household Int'l, Inc. v. Eljer Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A.13631, 1994 WL
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granted, are greater than the injury suffered by the defendant, if
217
the restraint is imposed.
The most important factor is the threat of irreparable injury
occuring before an evidentiary hearing is held. 2 18 Courts focus on
this factor and often grant temporary restraining orders, even if
the other two factors are not conclusively shown. 2 19 If the court
issues the temporary restraining order, the movant must provide
security (bond) for the payment of costs and damages incurred by
any party who has been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 220 The
court has wide discretion in determining the amount of the
2 21
bond.
After entry of a temporary restraining order, the enjoined
party may move for dissolution or modification of the injunction.
The court must hear and determine the motion as soon as possible. 222 To dissolve a temporary restraining order, the enjoined
party has the burden of proof that the court improvidently granted
the temporary restraining order by showing that one of the ele469169, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1994) ("lit is always appropriate for a court of
equity to ask what will occur if that extraordinary remedy is not issued.").
217. CarsonPine, 1995 WL 419980, at *3 ("A court will risk interference with
the business judgment of a board of directors (even interference for the short
period contemplated by a temporary restraining order) only when threatened irreparable injury will justify that step and that injury outweighs threatened injury to
the party enjoined."); Cottle, 1988 WL 10415, at *3 (noting in balancing interests of
parties, court should grant temporary restraining order unless court is persuaded
"that the risk of harm in granting the remedy is greater than the risk to plaintiff in
denying it").
218. Cottle, 1988 WL 10415, at *3 ("The essential predicate for issuance of the
remedy is a threat of imminent irreparable injury."); see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 65(b)
(noting that showing of irreparable injury is prerequisite to recovery).
219. Cottle, 1988 WL 10415, at *2-3 (recognizing focus of temporary restraining order is "not importantly upon an assessment of the probability of success, but is primarily upon the injury to the plaintiff"); see also US, 1987 WL 18108,
at *2 (noting "one cannot at this stage responsibly form any tentative judgment
about the relative merits of [the plaintiff's] positions," and also noting that central
inquiry was threat of immediate, irreparable injury).
220. DEL. CH. CT. R. 65(c). Rule 65(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Security. No restraining order... shall issue except upon the giving
of security by the applicant, in such sum as the Court deems proper, for
the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by
any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Any security given as a condition to the issuance of a restraining order
shall also constitute security for any preliminary injunction subsequently
issued and requiring security.
Id. See Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc., 221 A.2d 499, 505 (Del. Ch. 1966)
(noting bond must be posted as security to party later found to be wrongfully
enjoined).
221. Levin, 221 A.2d at 505.
222. DEL. CH. CT. R. 65(b) (noting motion must be heard "as the ends of
justice require").
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ments for a temporary restraining order does not exist.2 23 The enjoined party must deny the material allegations of the complaint
and petition with specificity.2 24 The court's initial decision with respect to a temporaryrestraining order is not binding at any other
2 25
stage of the proceeding.
The temporary restraining order, granted upon notice, will last
only as long as necessary for the parties to prepare for the preliminary injunction hearing. 22 6 During the pendency of the temporary
restraining order, the parties usually conduct expedited discovery
to prepare for the preliminary injunction hearing.2 27 Expedited
discovery can include depositions, interrogatories, and document
requests. As in all litigation, the parties frequently will disagree as
to the permissible scope of discovery. Discovery issues are then resolved through tools such as motions to compel and protective
orders.228
As a practical matter, many cases settle at this stage of the litigation. The production of documents and deposition testimony gives
the parties information that enables them to realistically evaluate
the factual strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Furthermore,
in deciding discovery disputes, the Chancery Court's rulings are
often indicative of how the court will ultimately rule on the merits.
Thus, the combination of information obtained in discovery from
the parties and the court's discovery rulings themselves frequently
push the parties to settle weak cases or force plaintiffs to voluntarily
22 9
dismiss weak cases.
223. Lionel Corp. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 525, 526 (Del. Ch. 1954) (noting enjoined party meets burden by denying material obligations of complaint with same
clearness and certainty with which they were charged).
224. Id. (denying motion to vacate preliminary injunction on basis that defendant did not specifically deny material allegations in complaint).
225. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987)
(denying temporary restraining order, but granting preliminary injunction).
226. See Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Gould, No. CIVA.14359, 1995 WL 419980,
at *3 (Del. Ch. July 12, 1995) (noting temporary restraining order is short in
duration).
227. See GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, 415 A.2d 473, 477 (Del. 1980) (noting after temporary restraining order was issued, expedited discovery was permitted); Arbitrium Handels AG v. Johnson, No. CIVA.13056, 1994 WL 586828, at *1
(Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1994) (explaining Chancery Court ordered expedited discovery
after entering temporary restraining order).
228. The Chancery Court rules governing discovery, Rules 26 to 37, are virtually identical to their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
229. Sometimes, a plaintiff may move to voluntarily dismiss weak claims pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 41(a) (2). Generally, a court will grant a voluntary
dismissal by a plaintiff unless the defendant will suffer "plain legal prejudice."
Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 863 (Del. 1993).
To determine whether a defendant would suffer "plain legal prejudice," the
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Preliminary Injunction

While a temporary restraining order enables the parties to conduct necessary discovery and prevent irreparable harm during that
discovery, a preliminary injunction prevents irreparable harm prior
to a trial on the merits.2

30

At the preliminary injunction hearing,

the movant is required to meet his burden of proof. Witnesses are
not generally called to testify at a preliminary injunction hearing.
Instead, in order to establish his right to a preliminary injunction,
the movant introduces deposition testimony, affidavits, documents,
other uncontested facts and briefs supporting the movant's position
on the relevant legal and factual issues.
There are two types of preliminary injunctions. A prohibitory
injunction prevents a party from taking action, while a mandatory
injunction compels a party to take action.23 1 A shareholder seeking
either type of preliminary injunction bears the burden of proving
the following: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits
at trial; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and
(3) that in balancing the equities, the risk of injury to the movant if
the injunction is not granted outweighs the injury suffered by the
opposing party if the order is granted.23 2 Sometimes, in balancing
court in Draperstated a variety of factors including: (1) the defendant's effort and
expense in trial preparation; (2) the plaintiff's excessive delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting the action; or (3) whether there has been sufficient explanation of the reason for a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the case. Id. Accordingly,
the Delaware courts have allowed voluntary dismissal even after defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment. Id.
230. See, e.g., Cohn v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 490 A.2d 569, 570 (Del. Ch. 1985)
(stating that in deciding preliminary injunction petition, courts are required to
make predictions on legal merits of case, and thus, become de jure decision makers of case, which in turn can avoid need for trial because of enhanced prospects
of settlement or voluntary dismissal).
231. See generally, Susan H. Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can
Principlesfrom the Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (noting distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions
developed in England's Court of Chancery and was later adopted by American
courts); Frederick P. Santarelli, Preliminaiy Injunctions in Delaware: The Need for a
ClearerStandard, 13 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 107, 135 n.1 (1988) (same).
232. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del. 1995)
(stating preliminary injunction granted where plaintiff establishes reasonable
probability of success on merits and irreparable harm) (citing Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1278 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1985)); Allen v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 1988) (same); see also In re Cencom Cable
Income Partners, L.P. Litig., No. CIVA.14634, 1996 WL 74726, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb.
15, 1996) (noting court will grant motion to dismiss and deny preliminary injunctive relief when plaintiff fails to adequately plead and cannot prove irreparable
harm).
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the equities, the court will expressly consider the public interest. 23 3
With respect to shareholder challenges of board decisions, the most
important element to obtain a preliminary injunction is whether
the shareholder has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits.

2 34

To succeed on an application for a mandatory preliminary injunction, however, the movant must clearly establish that he or she
is entitled to relief.23 5 Because the court will be granting what

amounts to final relief on an interim basis, 23 6 the court will grant a
mandatory preliminary injunction only where there is no genuine
233. Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. CIV.A.13845, 1994 WL
672698, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1985) (noting court must weigh public interest of efficient
justice in decision whether to grant preliminary injunction); Newell Co. v. Wm. E.
Wright Co., 500 A.2d 974, 975 (Del. Ch. 1985) (noting public interest is consideration in granting preliminary injunction).
234. Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1993); Home Shopping
Network, Inc. v. Liberty Media Corp., No. CIV.A.12868, 1993 WL 172371, at *11
(Del. Ch. May 19, 1993) (concluding that there were no disclosure violations and
no "business combinations" in violation of § 203). In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders
Litig., No. CIV.A.13656, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, Unitrin, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) is instructive on this issue. The court,
after finding likelihood of success on the merits, found that depriving shareholders of the opportunity to accept a potentially higher offer for their stock is irreparable. The Vice Chancellor further found that a repurchase of stock which may
later be improper will create irreparable harm as "it will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to compensate fully those shareholders who sold their stock or to
restore them to the status quo." Id. at *11. See also Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 657 (Del. Ch. 1988) (showing of interference with shareholder franchise creates irreparable harm); compare Chadha v. Szeto, No.
CIV.A.13210, 1993 WL 498186 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 1993) and Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1361 (holding in ambiguous factual circumstances, court has broad power to fashion equitable remedy until such time as there has been trial on merits of complaint) with Dolgoffv. Projectavision, Inc., No. CIVA.14805, 1996 WL 91945, at *9
(Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996) (holding even though director may be improperly in office, extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunction is inappropriate) (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Kerkorian, No. CW.A.6394 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16,
1980)).
Recently, Chancellor Allen indicated that even if the movant cannot establish
that the balancing of the equities would weigh in favor of granting a preliminary
injunction, the injunction can nevertheless be granted if the movant has clearly
established the violation of an important right. First Olefins Ltd. Partnership v.
American Olefins, Inc., No. CIVA.14707, 1996 WL 209719, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1,
1996) ("Only the clearest violation of an established and important right would
allow a court of equity to consider the issuance of an injunction in such
circumstances.").
235. Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574, 575 (Del. 1955) (noting plaintiff must
establish entitled relief prior to mandatory injunction being granted); Chadha,
1993 WL 498186, at *2 (noting plaintiff must establish legal right to invoke preliminary injunction); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Del. Ch.
1990) (stating plaintiff seeking mandatory preliminary injunction must establish
legal right he seeks to enforce or protect).
236. Alliance Gaming Corp. v. Bally Gaming Int'l, Inc., No. CIVA.14440,
1995 WL 523543, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 1995) (noting courts are particularly
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dispute with respect to a material fact.23

7

Thus, the standard be-

comes essentially a summary judgment standard and the court will
only award a mandatory preliminary injunction in a clear case.238
In many situations the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is
the end of the case as a practical matter. Many of the cases challenging board decisions never go to trial due to the time sensitive
nature of many board decisions and the difficulty of undoing a
transaction once it is complete.
In demonstrating the likelihood of success on the merits, the
shareholder bears the initial burden of establishing that the board
violated at least one of its triad of fiduciary duties, thereby rebutting
23 9
the business judgment rule's presumption of valid board action.
If the shareholder meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to
2 40
the directors to demonstrate the entire fairness of their actions.
hesitant to enter mandatory injunctive relief "in an ongoing contest for control
while the facts are in flux and constantly evolving").
237. Si-Lake v. Conroy, No. CIV.A.13787-NC, 1994 WL 728824, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 17, 1994) (stating court will grant mandatory preliminary injunction only in
"clear case, free from doubt"); Stahl 579 A.2d at 1120 (noting where material facts
exist in dispute, court ought not grant injunctive relief); Chadha, 1993 WL 498186,
at *2; Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., No. CIV.A.10907, 1989
WL 89449, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989).
238. Steiner, 111 A.2d at 575 (noting mandatory preliminary injunction not
granted unless right to relief is clearly established); Si-Lake, 1994 WL 728824, at *4;
Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1115; Kingsbridge, 1989 WL 89449, at *4 (noting grant of
mandatory preliminary injunction requires plaintiff meeting standard required for
summary judgment).
239. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del. 1995)
(tying injunction standard of "reasonable success on the merits" to summary judgment standard of "undisputed genuine issues of material fact"). In Kidsco Inc. v.
Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995), plaintiff
moved both for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction. Id. at 485. The
court found that, if plaintiff's basic premise as to summaryjudgment was correct,
"injunctive relief must follow as a matter of course." Id. at 492. The court denied
injunctive relief because the plaintiff failed to establish probable success on the
merits of any of their claims. Id.
240. Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (stating once shareholder rebuts presumption, burden shifts to directors to prove entire fairness); Unitrin, 651
A.2d at 1371; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
The court in Unitrin discussed that the burdens of proof in the preliminary
injunction hearing also shift to the board if shareholders can plead and show
board approval of a transaction resulting in sale of control or adoption of defensive measures in response to a threat for corporate control. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1371. In this context, the directors must then meet, even in the injunction hearing, the enhanced judicial scrutiny imposed upon them by Delaware law. Id. If the
directors satisfy the enhanced scrutiny in the injunction hearing, the shareholders
must then show that the business judgment rule does not apply because of a
breach of the duties of loyalty, care or good faith. Id. If however, the directors fail
to meet the enhanced scrutiny, they will then bear the burden of proof that their
actions were entirely fair. Id. Fuller analysis of these issues is reserved for Part II of
this Article and will not be addressed in this first part.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

61

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 1
1358

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1297

If the shareholders fail to rebut the business judgment rule or the
directors meet their burden of proof with respect to entire fairness,
the court will deny the preliminary injunction because the share2 41
holder failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits.

Even if the shareholder successfully rebuts the business judgment
rule and thereby shifts the burden to the directors with respect to
the likelihood of success on the merits, the stockholder still carries
the burden of proving irreparable injury and that the balance of
the equities favors granting the preliminary injunction.2 42 Thus,
even if a shareholder establishes a likelihood of success on the merits, the court will deny an injunction when it threatens far more
harm than it would prevent.
Either party may seek immediate appellate review of the grant,
2 43
denial, dissolution or modification of a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reviews the entire record
to determine whether the Chancery Court's findings are supported
by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deduc2 44
tive process.
C.

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

If the complaint does not request injunctive relief, the defendant frequently responds to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 12(b) (6).245
The purpose of this motion is to test whether the allegations of the
complaint, which are assumed to be true for purposes of the motion, state a claim for relief. This motion is filed within twenty days
246
of service of the complaint.
As with its federal rule counterpart, the Delaware pleading
rules require only notice pleading.2 47 A motion to dismiss for fail241. Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 182-83 (Del. Ch. 1993).
242. Nebenzahl v. Miller, No. CIVA.13206, 1993 WL 488284, at *4-5 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 8, 1993).
243.

DEL.

SuP. CT. R. 42.

244. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del.
1987).
245. DEL. CH. CT. R. 12(b) (6). Of course, the Delaware courts will first review
the court's personal jurisdiction prior to examining the merits of the pleading. See
Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 40 (Del. 1996) ("As a general rule, jurisdictional matters should be decided before substantive matters." (citing Branson v. Exide Electronics Corp., 625 A.2d 267, 268 (Del. 1993))).
246. DEL. CH. CT. R. 12(b).
247. Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, Nos. CIV.A.14696, 14623,
1996 WL 32169, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996) (noting rules are "very sympathetic
to plaintiffs"); see Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 ("Delaware courts have recognized that

the standard to be used to evaluate a Chancery Rule 12(b) (6) motion is less strin-
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ure to state a claim will not be granted unless it appears that the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be
proved in support of the plaintiff's claim. 248 Complaints alleging
breach of fiduciary duties must allege facts from which one could
reasonably conclude that the directors violated their fiduciary duties. 24 9 All well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true.25 0 The complaint must fairly apprise the defendants
of the facts that warrant the relief sought by the plaintiff. The court
will not make inferences or assume conclusions of law or fact to be
true without specific allegations of facts supporting the inferences
2 51
or conclusions.
gent than the standard applied when evaluating whether a pre-suit demand has
been excused in a stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule
23.1."); see also Friedman v. Beningson, No. CIV.A.12232, 1995 WL 716762, at *4
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1995) (noting where shareholder pleads particularized facts that
are demand futile, court will excuse shareholder from making demand); cf. Kahn
v. Roberts, No. CIVA.12324, 1994 WL 70118, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1994) (stating class action does not trigger such scrutiny of "particularized" facts).
248. Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. CIVA.12784, 1993 WL 77186, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 11, 1993) ("[A] complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears to a
reasonable certainly that the plaintiff could not be entitled to relief under any set
of facts.").
249. Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, G.P., No. CIV.A.12489, 1994 WL
89010, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 1994) (concluding "'directors, in reaching their
challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good
faith, loyalty or due care'" (quoting Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993))); Garza,
1993 WL 77186, at *5 (holding breach established by pleading that majority shareholders "fixed the price of shares being offered themselves below their real value
in furtherance of the individual defendants' scheme to impair the value of [plaintiff's] holdings in the Company and to dilute his interest therein and to enhance
the value of their own holdings"). In Garza, the complaint simply alleged that the
directors themselves owned 75% of the stock and that a stock offering was made
on a pro rata basis to all shareholders except the plaintiff, at a price deliberately set
below the value of plaintiff's stock. Ganza, 1993 WL 77186, at *2-3. The court held
that the complaint sufficiently alleged that a benefit was not shared with all shareholders equally, the directors had a personal financial interest in the transaction,
and the business judgment rule would not protect the directors' decisions. Id. at
*5-7.
A complaint, however, which merely alleges that the board did not negotiate a
sufficient tender offer and elected not to dispute certain actions did not state a
claim for breach of the duty of care. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 (noting absent pleading of facts, not conclusions, from which there could be drawn reasonable inference that there was coercion or lack of adequate disclosure, court will dismiss
challenge to fairness of board's transactions).
250. DEL. CH. CT. R. 10(c); Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056,
1059 (Del. 1986) (stating motion to dismiss that relies solely on arguments or
other materials outside of complaint will be denied, but may be treated as motion
for summary judgment); Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Garza, 1993 WL
77186, at *4 (noting facts outside complaint cannot be considered on motion to
dismiss); Porter v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, No. CIV.A.9114, 1989 WL 120358,
at *7 n.2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1989).
251. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985)
(stating allegations must be more than mere conclusions); Loudon v. Archer-Dan-
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The courts will apply a more stringent standard for complaints
alleging breach of the duty of disclosure. 25 2 Very similar to fraud
complaints, a complaint alleging breach of a duty of disclosure
must plead specific facts sufficient to state an actionable disclosure
claim.2 53 Specific damages or injury arising from the breach of the
duty of disclosure, however, need not be pleaded with particularity
25 4
to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Additionally the court may permit the shareholder to amend a
deficient complaint.2 55 If the complaint cannot be amended to
meet the motion to dismiss standard, the court will dismiss the complaint.25 6 Although the denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be appealed because it is not a final order, the grant of a
motion to dismiss is immediately appealable and is subject to a de
25 7
novo standard of review on appeal.
D.

Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings presents another op-

portunity for the Chancery Court to review the legal sufficiency of
the complaint. After the pleadings are closed, and before a summary judgment motion has been made, any party may move for
iels-Midland Co., No. CIVA.14638, 1996 WL 74730, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 1995)
(holding plaintiff did not state legal claim under § 225); Weiss v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., No. CIVA.12884, 1993 WL 155493, at *4 (Del. Ch.) (dismissing
frivolous legal conclusions of fiduciary duty owed), aff'd, 633 A.2d 373 (Del. 1993);
Norman v. Paco Pharmaceutical Servs., Inc., No. CIVA.10417, 1989 WL 110648, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1989) (stating allegations of fact "will not be assumed to be
true without specific allegations of facts which support the inferences or conclusions"); Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467, 469 (Del. Ch. 1982) (stating
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state claim when it appears on its face
that plaintiff cannot prove facts which will entitle him or her to relief); see also
Braunshweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. CIVA.10755, 1991 WL 3920
(Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991) (denying motion to dismiss where defendant directors rely
on affirmative defense of shareholder ratification).
252. For a discussion of the duty of disclosure, see supra notes 80-108 and
accompanying text.
253. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 65 (Del. 1995)
(stating "[n]on-disclosure claims must provide some basis for a court to infer that
the alleged omissions were material") (citation omitted).
254. In re Tristar Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993) (stating
proof of special damages not required in nondisclosure suit); Orban v. Field, No.
CIV.A.12820, 1993 WL 547187, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993) (same).
255. Needham v. Cruver, No. CIVA.12428, 1993 WL 179336, at *1 (Del. Ch.
May 12, 1993).
256. Kahn Bros. & Co. v. Fischbach Corp., No. CIVA.8987, 1989 WL 109406
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989).
257. Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc., 654 A.2d 403, 406
(Del. 1995).
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judgment on the pleadings.2 58 The court applies the same standard
for a motion for judgment on the pleadings as it would for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 12(b) (6).259
E.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Typically, the last chance to dismiss claims prior to trial is in a
motion for summaryjudgment. In rare instances, the court will exercise its power to grant summary judgment sua sponte when the
"'state of the record is such that the non-moving party is clearly
entitled to such relief."'2 60 According to the Chancery Court, "[a]
motion for summary judgment will be granted only where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." 2 61 Any doubts regarding the existence of an issue of material fact will be resolved, and all reasonable
factual inferences will be drawn, against the party moving for summaryjudgment.2 62 Inferences in favor of the movant must be supported by evidence (as opposed to mere assertions or allegations)
to prove each element of the claim.2 6 3 The court will deny a motion for summary judgment if affidavits raise a material factual issue 264 or if "there has been no opportunity for discovery."265
Upon a motion for summary judgment filed by the board, the
shareholder must be prepared to establish, through deposition tes258.

DEL. CH. CT.

R. 12(c).

259. Kahn v. Roberts, No. CIVA.12324, 1994 WL 70118, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb.
28, 1995) (noting court must accept nonmovant's well-pleaded factual allegations
as true and must afford nonmovant benefit of any reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from those allegations).
260. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 81 (Del. 1992) (quoting Bank of Del. v.
Claymont Fire Co. No. 1, 528 A.2d 1196, 1199 (Del. 1987)).
261. In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 799 (Del. Ch.
1993); see DEL. CH. CT. R. 56(c) (explaining affidavits or party seeking motion
must show "that there is not a genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
262. See Nash v. Connell, 99 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. Ch. 1953) ("The party moving for summaryjudgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of
any genuine issue of fact and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue will be
resolved against him.").
263. In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., No. CIVA.9477, 1992 WL 37304, at *4
(Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 1992) (explaining nonmoving party must support evidence of
factual inferences).
264. See MacCartor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 173 A.2d 344, 346
(Del. Ch. 1961) (denying summary judgment because affidavits raised material issue of fact).
265. See Si-Lake, Inc. v. Conroy, No. CIVA.13210, 1994 WL 728824, at *5
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1994) ("'This court should ... deny a motion for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction where there is a bona fide dispute as to an essential issue
and there has been no opportunity for discovery.'" (quoting Chadha v. Szeto, No.
CIV.A.13210, 1993 WL 498186, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 1993))).
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timony, affidavits and documents, that genuine issues of material
fact exist which must be resolved at trial. Sufficient pleading of a
breach of fiduciary duty is largely a matter of providing enough notice within the guidelines of established precedent. 266 In response
to a summary judgment motion, however, the Delaware courts will
review the information obtained during discovery to ensure that a
genuine dispute of material fact requires a trial. 267 Courts will
enter summary judgment after careful review of the undisputed
2 68
facts, applying the business judgment rule's presumptions.
Although the stated standard for summary judgment in Delaware is
virtually identical to that applied by federal courts, Delaware courts
seem to apply a stricter standard in fact than their federal
counterparts.
Only the grant of summary judgment can be appealed immediately.2 69 The Delaware Supreme Court's review of the Chancery
Court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. 270 Therefore, the
266. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. CIVA.8700, 1995 WL 600881, at *7
(Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1995) (mem.) (recognizing while complaint can recite facts
that raise question as to defendant directors' breach, plaintiff must demonstrate
genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment motion).
267. See In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 794 (Del. Ch.
1993) (reviewing "extensive discovery" when considering motion for summary
judgment).
268. Levy v. Stern, No. CIVA.11955, 1996 WL 118160, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12,
1996). In Levy, the court entered summaryjudgment in favor of the board because
plaintiff failed to present any genuine issue of intentional misconduct, bad faith or
disloyalty. Id. The court further refused plaintiff's request for additional discovery
because the request was too late. Id. Accordingly, the court granted the board's
motion for summary judgment. Id.
In Sea-Land, the Chancery Court granted the board's motion for summary
judgment seeking to dismiss claims of care and loyalty violations. Sea-Land, 642
A.2d at 807-08. The court found the shareholders' testimony as to loyalty violations to be "self-serving and conclusory ... speculative and lack[ing] ... evidentiary foundation." Id. at 807. In contrast, the undisputed material facts provided
evidence that a vast majority of the board was independent and acted in good
faith, relying upon financial and legal advisors. Id. at 806.
Alternatively, in Bryne v. Lord, No. CIV.A.14215, 1995 WL 684868 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 9, 1995) (mem.), the court entered summary judgment in favor of the shareholders because the directors, who were not independent, failed to meet the standards of the entire fairness test and a trial was necessary to resolve the directors'
liability. Id. at *1. Finally, summary judgment dismissing nondisclosure claims is
appropriate "if uncontroverted facts are so obvious that reasonable minds could
not differ on the question of materiality." Emerald, 1995 WL 600881, at *6 (citing
Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 771 (3d Cir. 1976)).
269. See generally Baylis v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 477 A.2d 1051 (Del.
1984) (noting denial of summary judgment motion is interlocutory and must generally await final judgment before any appeal).
270. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). In Williams, the Delaware
Supreme Court noted that it may draw "inferences in making factual determinations and in evaluating the legal significance of the evidence." Id. at 1375. See
Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994) (noting Dela-
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court analyzes the entire record, including the trial court's opinion,
pleadings, depositions and other relevant evidence contained in
the record, to determine whether summary judgment was
27 1
appropriate.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Part I of this Article has described some very basic principles
which apply in the normal case in which a shareholder challenges a
board's business decision. Part II of this Article will address these
basic principles in transactions outside of the typical business
decision.
As we noted in the Introduction, our goal is to provide a primer on the basic rules of the game. We have tried to give our readers a simple road map to understand how the fiduciary duties of
directors and the business judgment rule interact. We must caution
those relatively unfamiliar with Delaware law that while understanding the rules of the game is essential to effective representation of
the players, the simplicity of Part I of this Article does not fully reflect the sophistication and complexity of most cases in the Delaware courts. As we indicated, the Delaware courts have been
particularly adept at maintaining a high degree of flexibility in developing the Delaware law to diverse and complex situations, while
at the same time consistently applying the basic rules.
This Article also compartmentalizes the various principles to
make them easier to understand. Thus, a reader unfamiliar with
Delaware practice could infer that the shifting burdens and standard of review are always easily discernable. In practice, there are
very few bright lines. No bells ring or lights shine when the business judgment rule is rebutted or the board proves entire fairness.
Rather, each party presents its best case on the assumption that the
court will impose the burden of proof and the least desirable standard of review upon that party. Typically, the winner of the game is
not known until the Chancery Court, and often the Delaware
Supreme Court, ultimately determines the appropriate standard of
review and burden of proof and resolves the legal and factual issues
involved. The parties, however, will use the basic rules of the game
to persuade the courts to apply the most favorable standard of review and shift the burden of proof to their adversary.
ware Supreme Court will affirm the Chancery Court's "rulings unless they represent 'err[or] in formulating or applying legal principles"' (quoting Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1142 (Del. 1990))).
271. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 81 (Del. 1992).
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The nuances which this Article did not discuss are varied and
are frequently outcome determinative. Like all games, however, the
nuances cannot be appreciated or used effectively until the basics
have been mastered.
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